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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
A FRESH LOOK AT DECISION MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
CHOICES: FIRM INTERNATIONAL COHERENCE AND HOME-HOST COUNTRY
RELATEDNESS
by
Sokol Celo
Florida International University, 2011
Miami, Florida
Professor Aya Chacar, Major Professor
Understanding how decisions for international investments are made and how this
affects the overall pattern of investments and firm’s performance is of particular
importance both in strategy and international business research. This dissertation
introduced first home-host country relatedness (HHCR) as the degree to which countries
are efficiently combined within the investment portfolios of firms. It theorized and
demonstrated that HHCR will vary with the motivation for investments along at least two
key dimensions: the nature of foreign investments and the connectedness of potential host
countries to the rest of the world.
Drawing on cognitive psychology and decision-making research, it developed a
theory of strategic decision making proposing that strategic solutions are chosen close to
a convenient anchor. Building on research on memory imprinting, it also proposed that
managers tend to rely on older knowledge representation. In the context of international
investment decisions, managers use their home countries as an anchor and are more likely
to choose as a site for foreign investments host countries that are ‘close’ to the home
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country. These decisions are also likely to rely more strongly on closeness to time
invariant country factors of historic and geographic nature rather than time-variant
institutions. Empirical tests using comprehensive investments data by all public
multinational companies (MNC) worldwide, or over 15,000 MNCs with over half a
million subsidiaries, support the claims.
Finally, the dissertation introduced the concept of International Coherence (IC)
defined as the degree to which an MNE’s network comprises countries that are related. It
was hypothesized that maintaining a high level of coherence is important for firm
performance and will enhance it. Also, the presence of international coherence mitigates
some of the negative effects of unrelated product diversification. Empirical tests using
data on foreign investments of over 20,000 public firms, while also developing a homehost country relatedness index for up to 24,300 home-host pairs, provided support for the
theory advanced.
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I. INTRODUCTION
At the core of most dominant theories of foreign investment is the view of the
Multinational Enterprise (MNE) as a complex structure that capitalizes on the
imperfections of markets for intermediate products through market internalization
(Buckley & Casson, 1976; Hennart, 2007). While successful in explaining the existence
of the MNE, and the analysis of alternative modes of foreign market entry (Buckley &
Casson, 2009), these theories of foreign investment assume rationality in decision making
and mostly ignore the cognitive limitations of the managers that ultimately make the
decisions (Aharoni, 2010). This is a particularly important point in the context of
international investment location decisions, which are characterized by a very high level
of complexity and a large degree of information processing requirement (e.g., Bouquet,
Morrison & Birkinshaw, 2009). This dissertation looks at the decision making for such
investments from cognitive perspective and argues that cognitive limitations of managers
and heuristics they employ are, at least partly, responsible for the inter-country pattern of
investments that we observe. This pattern, in turn, when used to describe firm-level
international investment decision, helps explain the performance of MNEs. In Chapter 2
of the dissertation a reconceptualization of the notion of country relatedness is proposed
and it is argued that this novel approach is a superior way to describe the aggregate
pattern of international investments. In Chapter 3, the different heuristics and cognitive
limitations in operation during the decision making process for international investments
are examined, theory is built, and empirical tests are conducted on the role that such
limitations have for the observed pattern of country relatedness. Finally, in Chapter 4
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country relatedness is applied to the firm level and the question is examined whether it is
beneficial for the firm to operate in related countries.
Country Relatedness

Contrary to the impression created by predictions of a “borderless world”
(Ohmae, 1990) and “the end of nationality” (Reich, 1990), there is evidence that national
borders still matter and that the importance of geography and history has not disappeared
(Ghemawat, 2001; Jones, 2006a; Subramanian & Lawrence, 1999). An investigation of
trade and investment flows suggests that international business can be described more as
regionalized than globalized (e.g., Rugman, 2000). Ghemawat (2003: 139) also argues
that cross-border integration is far from complete and describes instead a semi-globalized
world in which the barriers to market integration while not high enough to insulate
countries completely do also not allow complete integration. This intermediate level of
globalization calls for attention to locational differences and gives international business
strategy its distinctive content (e.g., Ricart, Enright, Ghemawat, Hart, & Khanna, 2004).
However, describing the differences or similarities among countries is not an easy
task in the light of the multitude of approaches and dimensions that exist and can be used.
In fact, research in economics, sociology, ethnography, and political science, to mention
a few, has enlightened our understanding and provided different approaches to describing
country differences. However, when applied in the context of international investments,
these approaches seem to have several commonalities and make similar assumptions.
First, country differences are combined to create an all encompassing, one-dimensional
construct, which mostly uses the metaphor of ‘country distance’. Second, country
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distances are part of an exogenously determined background and firms and their
managers passive players that take these differences as given and not-negotiable. And
finally, from a methodological point of view, all the approaches confront the researcher
with the same type of unresolved questions, such as using objective vs. subjective or
macro vs. micro measures, and whether certain properties inherent to the ‘distance’
construct, such as symmetry can be extended to country distance concept.
Recent research has already started to question many of these assumptions and to
challenge the way how country differences are conceptualized and used. For instance,
despite offering a comfortable way to deal with complex problems (e.g., Hofstede, 1996)
one-dimensional indices of distance do not allow for the investigation of differential
effects that various components might have on firm strategy and performance (Xu &
Shenkar, 2002). Also, conceptualizations of country distance that do not involve the
decisions made by real managers are not able to reproduce the dynamic interaction of
MNEs with their host country environments (e.g., Shenkar, Luo, & Yeheskel, 2008) and
disregard the fact that strategies are formulated by managers based on their perceptions of
markets and the fit with their firm specific resources (Tallman, 1992). Finally, as many
authors have argued, and empirical evidence has demonstrated, several of the
assumptions made in the research on country distance are violated in the real world (e.g.,
Brock, Shenkar, Shoham, & Siscovick, 2008; Chapman, Gajewska-De Mattos, Clegg, &
Buckley, 2008; Luo, Shenkar, & Nyaw, 2001; Selmer, Chiu, & Shenkar, 2007; Shenkar,
2001).
In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, an attempt is made to address several of the
concerns mentioned earlier by offering a fundamentally new way of conceptualizing and
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measuring country differences. It shifts the focus from country distance to home-host
country relatedness (HHCR), defined as the degree to which countries are efficiently
combined within the investment portfolios of real firms. As such, it explicitly
acknowledges that country relatedness is the result of the interaction between factors
external to the firm, including national factors and competition, and the managers who
make and implement international investment decisions (e.g., Bryce & Winter, 2009). In
Chapter 2, the properties of HHCR are examined by building theory and testing
empirically the claims that HHCR is asymmetric, it differs for Foreign Direct
Investments (FDI) vs. Foreign Portfolio Investments (FPI), and that country relatedness,
while inherently a characteristic of a home-host country pair, is influenced by the
relatedness of the host country to the rest of the world.

What explains the pattern of Country Relatedness

In Chapter 2 it is argued that the best way to describe how countries differ, or are
related in the context of international investments, is by observing what real firms do.
The logical question that follows is why do we observe a certain pattern of HHCR? This
question is addressed in Chapter 3 and is part of a broader question, 'Why do countries
differ?’ and this is, or ought to be, the fundamental question in international business
strategy (Ghemawat, 2001; Ricart et al., 2004).
As noted earlier there are many dimensions along which countries may differ.
Previous research has expressed the need for integrative and comprehensive frameworks
(Berry, Guillen, & Zhou, 2010; Dow & Karunaratna, 2006; Ghemawat, 2001), but also
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pointed out that the choice should be driven by the research question in hand (Kostova,
1996; Ricart et al., 2004). This research helps identify different relevant dimensions of
country differences as antecedents of HHCR. However, in order to predict which
countries are chosen more frequently and which criteria are used to make the choices, I
turn the attention to the decision making process and the cognitive constraints of
managers that are responsible for those decisions (Aharoni, 2010; Hambrick & Mason,
1984). While the presence of such cognitive constraints for humans in general and
managers in particular has been long demonstrated (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Dutton
& Jackson, 1987), how they translate into certain patterns of decision making in the
context of international investments is less investigated. In Chapter 3 research in
cognitive psychology, as well as on memory imprinting, is built upon to investigate the
role of bounded rationality and the systematic reliance on heuristics and biases on
decision making for international investments. More precisely, it is first asked whether or
not managers are biased towards choosing, as investment locations, host countries that
are close to a convenient anchor and it is put forth that the home country is such an
anchor. Next, an investigation of the factors that are used to determine ‘closeness’
between home and host country is conducted that distinguishes between two groups of
factors: i) historical and time invariant factors, such as geographic distance or colonial
ties, and ii) time varying institutional factors, typically changing frequently. It makes the
prediction that time invariant factors, or differences among countries in terms of such
factors, will be more salient in the minds of the managers and hence more important in
predicting their choices.
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How do country differences matter for MN-performance?

While in Chapter 2 and 3 descriptions and explanations of the pattern of
relatedness between countries in the context of international investments are made, in
Chapter 4 a focus on the implications of country relatedness for MNE-performance. Just
as strategy research distinguishes between related and unrelated industry diversification,
an MNE can have operations in countries that are related or unrelated. This degree of
relatedness among different locations results in a certain degree of location-specificity,
which should be balanced against other types of specificity such as that related to
knowledge or technology (e.g., Ghemawat, 2003). In Chapter 4 the concept of
International Coherence, the degree to which an MNE operates in related countries, is
introduced as a way to capture the location-specificity associated with the network of an
MNE and how it influences MNEs’ performance is investigated. Different from previous
research on multinationality and performance that focuses on the impact of internal
resources configurations, such as scope, degree on performance (e.g., Contractor, Kundu,
& Hsu, 2003; Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997; Tallman & Li, 1996), International
Coherence describes the fit between the resources and the external environment. This
type of coherence, or an emphasis on “operations across multiple locations that are
distinct from, but not entirely independent of, each other” (Ghemawat, 2003: 147), makes
research in international business distinct from mainstream strategy research (Ricart et
al., 2004). The concept of International Coherence is built on the concept of country
relatedness described in Chapter 2. As such, it is distinct from the concept of institutional
complexity (e.g., Goerzen & Beamish, 2003) in that it accommodates both fundamental
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types of value-adding international diversification strategies: exploiting the similarities
across countries and arbitraging, or exploiting differences among countries (e.g.,
Ghemawat, 2003).
In Chapter 4 it is proposed that MNEs capitalize on their unique, rare, and
valuable resources (Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 1979) by developing over time the resources
and capabilities that best fit their current external environment. For an MNE, the
reutilization of existing resources and capabilities in a new environment (Penrose, 1959)
is more likely to lead to superior performance when the new environment is somewhat
related to the firms’ current external environment. Hence a high level of International
Coherence facilitates the transfer of firms’ location-specific resources and capabilities
from one specific location to others within the MNEs network and leads to competitive
advantage for MNEs (Goerzen & Beamish, 2003).
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II. HOME-HOST COUNTRY RELATEDNESS

Introduction
“Similarity plays a fundamental role in theories of knowledge and
behavior. It serves as an organizing principle by which individuals
classify objects, form concepts, and make generalizations” (Tversky,
1977: 327).
The international business literature has seen a growing interest in the concept of
country distance fueled in part by a renewed interest in location (Dunning, 1980, 1998;
Porter, 1990). Country distance is generally defined by single drivers that are external to
the firm such as culture (e.g., Jensen & Szulanski, 2004) or geography (e.g. Kang & Kim,
2010), or sets of drivers such as national institutions (e.g., Kostova, 1996; Xu & Shenkar,
2002). Much research has examined distance and its consequences from gravity models
to institutional theory and research on cultural distance, although several scholars note
that the question of how to determine country distance is underexplored (e.g., Verbeke &
Brugman, 2009).
In this study, we shift the focus to country relatedness, rather than distance, which
we define as the degree to which countries are efficiently combined within the investment
portfolios of real firms. While the distance studied in past work may be determined in an
objective fashion and independent of firm actions, country relatedness on the other hand
is not. Unlike past research, we argue that just as industry relatedness cannot be
determined independently of firm actions (Teece, Rumelt, Dosi, & Winter, 1994),
country relatedness cannot be considered as exogenous to firms. Our conceptualization of
country relatedness explicitly acknowledges the relationship between factors external to
the firm, including national factors and competitive interaction, and the managers who
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make and implement international investment decisions with resources at hand (Bryce &
Winter, 2009). Hence, country relatedness is best revealed by the actual patterns of
international investments made by multinational firms between any two countries.
We do not speculate as to the underlying nature of the attraction among countries
but rather rely on the fact that firms from one home country, rightly or wrongly, make
investments in particular host countries. Subsequently, the survival principle (e.g.,
Alchian, 1950; Stigler, 1958; Teece et al., 1994) suggests that competitive forces and
strategic realignments within firms will lead some to remain in those countries and others
to withdraw. Ultimately, the observed pattern of investments from any one home to any
one host country represents what has ‘survived’ over time, or country relatedness.
We also hypothesize that country relatedness is asymmetric, in line with some
growing voices within the country distance research (Dow & Karunaratna, 2006;
Drogendijk & Zander, 2010; Håkanson & Ambos, 2010; Shenkar, 2001; Tung &
Verbeke, 2010). We specifically argue that such an asymmetry is likely due to differing
home nation economic factors, informal and formal institutions, and ensuing path
dependencies. We hence label the concept proposed home-host country relatedness
(HHCR).
We next propose that HHCR, even in the narrow context of international
investments, is not an absolute measure but will vary with the investment motivations of
firms. These motivations are likely to differ at least along two essential dimensions: the
nature of the investments made and the connectedness of the host country. First,
investments can be of a portfolio-type or foreign direct investment (FDI). While the
motives of FDI include obtaining return through both the financial contribution and
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transfer of intangible assets by maintaining control, the motives of foreign portfolio
investment (FPI) are financial returns with no intent for influence or control (e.g.,
Wilkins, 1999). These differences translate into differing managerial and other resource
requirements, and risk levels, which we propose lead to differing levels of HHCR.
Second, countries with higher levels of connectedness may be more attractive as host
sites and could serve as potential bridges to other international business investments
(Neumayer & Plümper, 2010). Hence, we hypothesize that HHCR is likely greater for
host countries with greater levels of connectedness to other countries, which we define as
the degree to which a country – as a home country – is related to other countries in terms
of international investments.
Following our theoretical review below of research relevant to country
relatedness, and our conceptual development, we present the details of our study and our
results. The results obtained support our hypotheses. We believe that the home-host
country relatedness concept, focused on efficient combinations of countries within actual
firms, provides a novel way to examine the attractiveness of countries for international
investments, albeit borrowed from work on industry relatedness (Bryce & Winter, 2009;
Lien & Klein, 2009; Teece et al., 1994). Through the required empirical work, we also
ultimately provide several outcome-based measures of HHCR that complement current
indices of country distance and expand their coverage, allowing for truly global research
(Franke & Richie, 2010; Tung & Verbeke, 2010).
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Literature Review
Country Distance and MNC Investments
Environmental conditions external to MNCs’ operations are extremely crucial to
their success (e.g., Byé, 1958; Chacar, Newburry, & Vissa, 2010). More specifically, the
distance from a home to a host country is seen as an important element adding
complexity to MNC operations. For example, Buckley and Casson (1976) highlighted
that social and linguistic dissimilarities among regions increase the costs of resource
transfer while in contrast, a low cultural, administrative, geographic and economic
distance (Ghemawat, 2001), despite reducing arbitraging and network externality
benefits, may facilitate knowledge transfer and absorption in practice (Rugman &
Verbeke, 2004). Three research streams are concerned with explaining foreign
investments and firms’ international activities in relationship to country distance, namely
gravity models, cultural and psychic distance research, and institutional theory of
international business. This research, reviewed below, has proposed in one way or
another that greater distance will decrease these investments and activities, along with
their success.

Gravity Models on Country Relatedness
Gravity models (e.g., Anderson, 1979; Tinbergen, 1962) seek to explain
international trade and foreign direct investment patterns at the home-host country level,
by examining time invariant elements of a historical and geographic nature, such as
language, country size, and geographic distances among countries. They trace back to the
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Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade theory (e.g., Leamer, 1995) and subsequent formal
horizontal (Markusen, 1984) and vertical (Helpman, 1984) models of FDI. These models
posit that, like the gravity law in physics, the economic interaction between any two
countries, a concept similar to country relatedness, is positively related to their economic
‘mass’ and negatively to their ‘distance’ (e.g., Ricart et al., 2004).
In this work, trade flows among countries are primarily a function of each
country’s GDP (economic mass) and of the geographic distance among them. In addition,
this research stream emphasizes the distance among time-invariant or slowly changing
institutional elements including skilled labor endowments, trade and investment costs,
and language (e.g., Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet, & Mayer, 2007). More recent research in this
area has attended to membership in regional political and economic agreements (e.g.,
Baltagi, Egger, & Pfaffermayr, 2008), and spatial dependence (when choices made in a
unit of analysis depend on the choices made in other units) (e.g., Blonigen, Davies,
Waddell, & Naughton, 2007; Neumayer & Plümper, 2010), as additional gravity
elements.
Gravity models have found empirical support in research aiming to explain the
drivers of bilateral FDI between pairs of countries (Ricart et al., 2004) and have given a
robust empirical description of international investment patterns (Bénassy-Quéré et al.,
2007). Their success indicates that the elements driving gravity may also underlie homehost country relatedness.
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Cultural and Psychic Distance on Country Relatedness
Cultural or psychic distance research has suggested that operating in culturally
distant countries may result in differences in organizational characteristics (Kogut &
Singh, 1988), higher costs of doing business abroad (Hymer, 1976), or increased
liabilities of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995). Entry mode choices for international
investments may reflect attempts to minimize cultural distance between parent and host
countries (e.g., Kogut & Singh, 1988). Further, once those choices are made, cultural
distance is expected to influence factors such as FDI performance (e.g., Tihanyi, Griffith,
& Russell, 2005) and knowledge transfer (e.g., Reus & Lamont, 2009; Sarala & Vaara,
2010).
Paralleling cultural distance studies, Beckerman (1956: 38) argued that: “it is
probable that the manner in which the purchases of raw materials by a firm are
distributed geographically will depend partly on the extent to which foreign sources have
been personally contacted and cultivated.” This emphasis on “non-economic” cost
factors, or psychic distance was echoed in Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975: 308)
and beyond. This research strand argues that MNCs seize expansion opportunities in the
neighborhood of their existing knowledge base(s) by choosing countries that are
‘psychically’ close, suggesting that psychic and cultural distance may be additional
elements that drive country relatedness.
Hofstede’s work (1980) on quantifying culture and the Kogut and Singh (1988)
index played instrumental roles in these two research traditions, albeit offering
contradicting theoretical predictions regarding the role of culture (see Tihanyi et al., 2005
for a review). The ever growing body of research in this area indicates its traction and
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popularity, albeit researchers have critiqued the definitions and subjective interpretations
of the cultural and psychic distance concepts and their measurement (e.g., Drogendijk &
Zander, 2010; Håkanson & Ambos, 2007; Tung & Verbeke, 2010).

Institutional Theory on Country Relatedness
Institutional theory has been used to pinpoint how differences between the
institutions of two countries impact important firm outcomes (e.g., Kostova, 1999).
Equating the institutional environment to national boundaries and drawing on North
(1990) and Scott’s (1995) work on institutions, international business scholars have
highlighted the need to bridge across institutions for MNC success (e.g., Berry et al,
2010; Mudambi & Navarra, 2002; Westney & Zaheer, 2001). Kostova’s (1996) main
proposition, consistent with the research stream that followed, is that a large institutional
distance increases MNC difficulties in understanding host environments and their
legitimacy requirements and the need to adapt organizational practices and capabilities to
host country conditions (Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Xu & Shenkar, 2002).
This school brings one of the most theoretically comprehensive approaches to
identifying elements relevant to country relatedness, while adding a ‘dose’ of nonefficiency thinking to this concept (Xu & Shenkar, 2002). Unlike gravity models, it is
hard to identify “stylized facts” based on the growing empirical research available (e.g.,
Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Dikova, Sahib, & van Witteloostuijn, 2010). Issues
such as whether all pillars are considered and what indicators are used to capture them
are generally left to researchers’ discretion, making comparison across studies
problematic. Research also indicates that overall institutional distance might be less
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appropriate to describe country relatedness, since each institutional dimension can
influence firm behavior differently (e.g., Estrin, Hanousek, Kočenda, & Svejnar, 2009;
Gaur & Lu, 2007; Xu & Shenkar, 2002).

Theory Development
Country Relatedness in Use
While at first hand, relatedness may seem like the inverse of distance, the term is
carefully chosen to emphasize differences in the attributes of these concepts. We define
country relatedness as the degree to which countries are efficiently combined within the
investments of real firms. Three important features should be noted here. First, we follow
Kostova’s (1996: 98) suggestion of conceptualizing and operationalizing country
relatedness in a single context which can help increase ‘its explanatory and predictive
power’. In our work, country relatedness is used and studied in the context of firms’
international investment decisions, while country distance is generally perceived as
context-free. Second, we build our definition by focusing on country relatedness as an
outcome of international investments while distance is viewed as a driver for these
investments. We also do not speculate as to the underlying nature of the attraction
between two countries but rather rely on the fact that firms from one home country,
rightly or wrongly, make investments in particular host countries. Specifically, we argue
that country relatedness is best revealed by the actual pattern of investments between any
two countries. Even if some of these investments are imperfect or subject to agency
concerns, the survivor principle (e.g., Alchian, 1950; Stigler, 1958; Teece et al., 1994)
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suggests that they ultimately face competitive forces that lead to their modifications (Lien
& Klein, 2009). Ultimately, the observed pattern of investments from any one home to
host country represents what has ‘survived’ over time, or country relatedness.
Finally, in line with several country distance researchers (e.g., Dow &
Karunaratna, 2006; Håkanson & Ambos, 2010; Shenkar, 2001; Tung & Verbeke, 2010;
Tversky, 1977), we maintain that country relatedness is asymmetric, considering that
influencing factors likely differ with home nation factors. We hence label the concept we
propose home-host country relatedness (HHCR). We formally hypothesize and test the
asymmetric nature of HHCR. This hypothesis is further developed below, along with
three others that examine the impact of investment motivation on HHCR.

Relatedness Depends on the Vantage Point
While countries’ physical distance is clearly symmetrical, the actual overall
relatedness between two countries, when it comes to international investments, may not
be. International investment choices are driven by firm and managerial actions. These are
often impacted by differing national factors including national economic factors, informal
and formal institutions, and ensuing path dependencies. For example, country wealth and
size are two of many factors that may alter international investment behavior with firms
from smaller countries, for example, internationalizing at times faster in their search for
markets and economies of scale (Hennart, 2007). National culture, one of many informal
norms, has been noted as a key driver of strategic behavior and choice since it influences
“the nature of the relationship of an organization with its environment as well as
relationships among people within an organization” (Schneider, 1989: 149). National
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informal institutions also likely impact individual risk preferences and decision making
styles, which ultimately may affect the likelihood of foreign investment success (Luo et
al., 2001). Finally, formal national institutions and history may lead to many differences,
such as in firm strategies (e.g., Chapman et al., 2008; Flores & Aguilera, 2007).
Ultimately, these differences give managers different vantage points and different
preferences for a host environment (Luo et al., 2001).
In country distance research, Shenkar (2001) calls cultural distance symmetry an
“illusion” and demonstrates empirically that the effects of culture on expatriate
deployment and adjustment are asymmetric (Brock et al., 2008; Selmer et al., 2007). Luo
et al. (2001) argue that parent firms from different countries have vantage points with
different starting home institutional strengths and familiarity levels with the host
environment. More supporting evidence comes from Håkanson and Ambos (2010) who
demonstrate that a country’s wealth impacts its perceived distance from a home country.
Anecdotal evidence also shows that Chinese FDI into Africa differs from FDI patterns of
other countries that seem to be equally ‘distant’ (Braga de Macedo, Pereira & Lopes,
2009).
Hence, differing national factors are likely to be reflected in differing patterns of
foreign investments and also in differing success rates, ultimately leading to asymmetry
in country relatedness. Formally:

Hypothesis 1: The relatedness of Country A to Country B can differ from the
relatedness of Country B to Country A.
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Relatedness Depends on the Investment Type: Portfolio or Direct
We propose that HHCR is likely to differ with the investment level undertaken in
a host country, considering that motivation for these investments may vary. Theories of
international investment commonly divide overseas investment into two categories –
direct investment which involves “a strategic long-term relationship … to ensure a
significant degree of influence by the direct investor in the management of the direct
investment enterprise” and portfolio investment, in which “investors do not generally
expect to influence the management of the enterprise” (OECD, 2008: 10). This is an
important distinction considering foreign investments are often part of a business strategy
(FDI) while FPI motives are more likely to be financial returns with no intent for
influence or control (Wilkins, 1999). FDI and FPI also differ substantially (Dunning &
Dilyard, 1999), because “(i) FDI includes the transfer of non-financial, as well as
financial assets; (ii) FDI involves continuing control, while FPI does not; (iii) FDI is
usually more lumpy and indivisible than FPI; and (iv) FPI tends to be prompted by
financial returns that are higher abroad than those at home, while motivations for
individual FDI projects are far broader” (Wilkins, 1999: 56-57). Parent involvement
designed to give the parent a controlling interest in a foreign subsidiary requires at the
very least significant time investments from the parent’s top management team towards
the redeployment and development of significant resources and capabilities into the new
subsidiary (e.g., Buckley & Casson, 1976; Chen, Park & Newburry, 2009; Dunning,
1980; Hymer, 1976; Rugman, 1975). Hence, the motivations for these investments often
differ as well as the managerial and other resource requirement, ultimately leading to
differing levels of country relatedness. In addition, they differ in how they interact with
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the business environment with FPI being highly volatile and sensitive to macroeconomic
changes (such as GDP/capita) and shocks compared to FDI (Busse & Hefeker, 2007;
Guerin, 2006). We thus propose the following:

Hypothesis 2: HHCR for FDI is different than for FPI.

Connectedness of the Host Country to the Rest of the World Matters for
Relatedness
Motivation for investing in a host country is also likely to differ with the
connectedness of the host country to the rest of the world, defined as the degree to which
the country is related to the rest of the world in terms of foreign investment. Host
countries with higher connectedness can be used as a bridge for further international
investments by MNCs. For example, Hong Kong has long been known as a gateway to
investing in mainland China in addition to much of south-east Asia (e.g., Kruthanawat,
2010). Similarly, with the rise of trade agreements and broader associations among
groups of countries, firms often use a single country as an initial access point. Thus, firms
wishing to develop a larger presence in the European Union may first invest in Germany
or the United Kingdom as a bulkhead before proceeding to invest more broadly (e.g.,
Filippaios & Papanastassiou, 2008). Finally, locations with higher levels of
connectedness can also be in and of themselves attractive investment locations. For
example, England, and especially the city of London, is where banks from around the
world can conduct ‘international’ banking business on location. Hence, we propose that
an MNC’s decision to invest in a host country is, therefore, not made in isolation and
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independent from the position that the target host country occupies relative to the rest of
the world.
This dependency of relations formed within a dyad on the relations with other
dyads (Neumayer & Plümper, 2010) is called spatial dependence, and has been used to
explain patterns of diffusion of bilateral investment treaties (Elkins, Guzman, &
Simmons, 2006; Neumayer & Plümper, 2010), corporate environmental standards
(Perkins & Neumayer, 2010), preferential trade agreements (Manger, 2006), and bilateral
alliance formation (Gartzke & Gleditsch, 2006). We hence expect the connectedness of a
potential host country to drive HHCR. Formally:

Hypothesis 3: All else being equal, HHCR is positively associated with the
connectedness of the host country to the rest of the world.

As a corollary, we suggest that an investing firm may pursue a non-direct path
when investing in a third country, which is not presently highlighted. The concept of
betweenness in network theory (e.g., Krackhardt, 1990; Wasserman & Faust, 1994)
suggests that the shortest path from a home to a host country may very well be via one of
the investments that the firm has made in another host country rather than via the parent.
Subsidiaries indeed can and do function as bridges (Granovetter, 1973), helping firms in
their internationalization processes by establishing a foothold in a region and assisting
firms in developing capabilities (e.g., Buckley & Gauri, 2004; Parada, Alemany &
Planellas, 2009). More formally:
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Hypothesis 4: The shortest distance to a host from a home country can be via a
third country.

Methods
Inferring Country Relatedness from Firm Actions
To complete this study, we obtained data from the OSIRIS-database of Bureau
van Dijk, retrieved in 2009. This database provides information on investments by nearly
all public companies worldwide and on the level of direct and total ownership (total
ownership includes direct ownership plus ownership through intermediate firms). We
extracted from this database the complete set of international investments made by public
firms, with a foreign investment defined as ownership in a company that is headquartered
in another country, called the Full Sample. We also created two subsamples: the FDISample and FPI-Sample. We defined FDI as investments involving an equity stake of
10% or more (OECD, 2008). This definition is employed by international and national
accounting standards (including United States Department of Commerce), the World
Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (Razin & Sadka, 2007; Wilkins, 1999). For a
robustness check, we also used the stricter 50% ownership cut-off for FDI redefined
(Dunning & Dilyard, 1999) which is considered the ultimate indication of control
(Goldstein & Razin, 2006), albeit the number of investments with ownership levels
between 10% and 50% is relatively small. In both cases, the difference between the Full
and FDI Samples is the FPI Sample. These samples characteristics are summarized in
Table 1.
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Table 1: HHCR Measures Used and Sample Characteristics
Sample Characteristics
Number of firms
Host countries
Home countries
Number of investments
Number of home-host pairs
HHCR Mean
HHCR Std Deviation
# HHCR at Max (>=.99)
# HHCR at Min (-1)
# of home-host pairs
excluding HHCR=-1:

Full
Sample
20,051
204
118
422,877
24,352
-.79
.49
137
19,692

FDI-Sample
(cutoff 10%)
18,948
204
114
231,664
23,133
-.80
.48
82
18,702

FPI-Sample
(cutoff 10%)
2,465
134
88
181,551
11,687
-.85
.44
106
10,133

FDI-Sample
(cutoff 50%)
18,145
204
108
213,686
21,915
-.80
.48
84
17,737

FPI-Sample
(cutoff 50%)
5,495
184
105
199,529
19,197
-.84
.46
152
16,729

4,660

4,431

1,554

4,178

2,468

To create the Full Sample, we started with 44,891 public companies from 134
home countries with more than one million subsidiaries in 206 host countries. After
removing subsidiaries without country information (17,214) and subsidiaries in the home
country (566,143 subsidiaries), this sample contained 422,877 foreign investment data of
20,051 MNCs from 118 home countries and 204 host countries. To obtain the FDI and
Portfolio Investments samples, we used only investments for which ownership data was
available (413,215 or about 98% of the Full Sample). We then used 10% ownership as
the cut-off between the FPI and FDI Samples, with ownership computed as the
percentage of direct or total ownership, whichever was available, or their maximum when
both were available. The FDI-Sample consisted of 231,664 investments (average
ownership 78.6%) by 18,948 MNCs from 114 home countries in 204 host countries and
the FPI-Sample of 181,551 investments (average ownership 1.12%) by 2,465 firms from
88 home countries in 134 host countries.
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Measures
Home-Host Country Relatedness: HHCRij(Full), HHCRij(FDI), and HHCRij(FPI)
are computed each within its sample in two steps. First, we calculate hhcrij, the ratio of
the actual percentage of investments of firms from the home country i in the host country
j, compared to the expected percentage when considering investments from the rest of the
world (see Equation 1 below). hhcrij equals 0 if there are no such investments, 1 if the
percentage equals that from the rest of the world, and greater than 1 when the first
proportion exceeds the worldwide proportion.

ℎℎ

∗
∙∗

∙
∙
∙∙

∙∙

∙

∙

∙

Equation 1: Formula for hhcrij

where:
- INVij is the number of foreign investments by firms from country i in country j,
- INVi• is the total number of foreign investments from country i,
-INV•j is the number foreign investments in host country j,
- INV•• is the overall number of investments worldwide

In a second step, we transform hhcrij into HHCRij using the formula proposed by
Iapadre, 2001 (Equation 2), considering hhcrij ranges from 1 to infinity for pairs of
countries that are similar, but only from 0 to 1 for dissimilar countries (Dalum, Laursen,
& Villumsen, 1998). Such transformation removes the undesirable mathematical
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asymmetry which can create problems when such an index is used in certain econometric
specifications so that HHCRij that takes values between -1 and 0 for unrelated or weakly
related countries and from 0 to 1 for highly related countries. Appendix 1 describes this
measure and all others used for the analyses.

ℎℎ
ℎℎ

1
1

Equation 2: Transformation of hhcrij

This index is a variant of the ‘index of revealed comparative advantages’
proposed by Balassa (1965: 99) and used in the context of specialized trade patterns (Li
& Guisinger, 1992; Porter, 1990; Proudman & Redding, 2000). It captures relatedness by
examining the observed pattern of firms’ international investment decisions from a home
to a host country, after market selection, compared to the frequency that would result
under the random hypothesis. This comparison is based on the survivor-principle (Lien &
Klein, 2009; Teece et al., 1994), which suggests that host countries that are more
frequently chosen by actual firms are more closely related to home countries than
countries that are rarely selected.
Let us illustrate this measure with an actual example. There are 83,509 U.S.
foreign investments in the sample, out of which 2,224 are located in Mexico (approx.
2.6%). In comparison, out of a total of 339,368 non-US foreign investments worldwide,
3,369 are located in Mexico, or around 1%, which indicates that even after selection by
competition, U.S. firms have proportionately more investments in Mexico than the rest of
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the world. This leads to a value of 2.68 for hhcr between the US as the home and Mexico
as the host country, or .46 for HHCR (Equation 3). Appendix 2 presents HHCR for each
pair of OECD countries (home countries in rows and host countries in columns).

ℎℎ

,

2,224
83,509
5,593 2,224
422,877 83,509

2.68

Equation 3: Example of hhcrij calculation

Host Country Connectedness HCCi: is the sum of weighted HHCRij for all host
countries j (Equation 4). This measure weighs the third countries by their potential
importance for investments in order to capture the predicted connectedness effects
(whereas the HHCRij measure controls for the size of the country). For instance, the
relatedness between Austria and Slovakia is higher than that of Austria and Germany
(which means that the pattern of investments of Austrian firms deviates more from the
expected pattern in Slovakia than Germany). However, from the point of view of an
investor who is going to use Austria as a bridge, the link to Germany is likely to play a
more important role. For this reason, we use as weights inward FDI-flows expressed as a
percentage of worldwide FDI. For example, in 2006, Germany attracted 3.9% of world
FDI-flows compared to 0.3% for Slovakia; in terms of FDI-stock, the percentages were
4.77 and 0.27 respectively. HCCi(FDI), HCCi(FPI) and HCCi(Full) are each calculated
within their respective samples.
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∗
Equation 4: Calculation of HCCj

Where HCCj is the Host Country Connectedness for country j, HHCRjk is the
Home-Host Country Relatedness of home country j to host country k, and wk is the
weight associated to country k.
Bridge to Host Country Relatedness (BHCRij): For each home country i, host
country j, and an intermediate country k, we define the relatedness of the path i→k→j as
the Min (HHCRik, HHCRkj) and Bridge to Host Country Relatedness (BHCRij) as the
maximum relatedness considering all the paths connecting the home with the host
country (Equation 5; see also Neffke & Svensson Henning, 2008). In other words, to use
an intermediate country k as a bridge, both the relatedness of home i to host k and the
relatedness of home k to host j should be greater that the relatedness of home i to host j.
This measure is conservative compared to other potential measures, such as the average
of HHCRik and HHCRkj as the relatedness measure for the path i→k→j.

,

,

Equation 5: Calculation of BHCRij

Control variables: We use for controls throughout home and host country
dummies and for hypothesis 3, we add the elements of psychic distance proposed by Dow
and Karunaratna (2006), and described in Appendix 1.
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Statistical Methods
We test H1, H2, and H4 using paired mean t-tests and partial correlation analysis
to control for the fact that observations are not independent of home and host country
factors. To test H3, we run a specific target contagion model (Neumayer & Plümper,
2010) with some modifications to address our specific research question. In contrast to
models offered by Neumayer & Plümper (2010), the model used here (Equation 6) takes
into consideration the fact that what is a ‘target’ country in the main relationship (our
dependent variable) becomes a ‘source’ on the explanatory side. The model is:

∗

∗

Equation 6: Statistical model for HHCRij

where HHCRij is the relatedness of home country i to host country j, HCCj is the
connectedness of host country j, and Dij are different types of distances of home country i
to host country j, used as control variables. As in other analyses, we control for home and
host countries.
A large number of HHCR are at the minimum or -1 (around 80% of observations
for Full-Sample, 81% for FDI-Sample, and 87% for FPI-Sample), as the investments
observed from the home to the host are minimal compared to the rest of the world’s
firms’ investments in that same host country. For instance, HHCRZimbabwe,Albania=HHCRAlbania,Zimbabwe=-1.

Since these observations might be driving the relationships observed,

we report also the results for the “corrected samples” where such observations have been
removed.
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Summary Statistics
We are able to calculate HHCRij for 24,352/23,133/11,686 country pairs for the
Full/FDI/FPI Sample respectively. Since many observations have the minimum value of 1, the mean HHCR is very low: around -.8 for the Full and FDI samples, and -.84 for FPI.
In the corrected samples, when observations with minimum value are removed, the mean
HHCR becomes .16/.063/.076 for the Full/FDI/FPI Sample respectively. In comparison,
HHCR is over .99 in few cases: 137/82/106 for the Full/FDI/FPI Sample respectively.
HHCRij(Full) is highly correlated with HHCRij(FDI) and HHCRij(FPI) (at .96 and
.53). The correlation between HHCRij(FDI) and HHCRij(FPI) is .43. The correlations of
all three (direct) measures with the BHCRij are lower (between 18% and 33%).
While it is impossible to report all the HHCRij calculated, Table 3 presents the
results for the OECD countries (home countries in rows and host countries in columns)
for the Full Sample. France and Luxembourg have the highest number of OECD-host
countries with which they have a positive relatedness (20 countries for each). On the
other extreme, Chile, as a home country, has a positive relatedness to a single OECD-host
country (Mexico). Calculating the maximum for each row (respectively column) provides
information about the OECD-host (respectively home) country a particular country is
closest to. For instance, Japan, as a home country, is the closest to host country Republic
of Korea. However, as a host country, Japan is the closest to home country U.S.
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Results
We test the hypotheses proposed and then conduct a series of robustness checks
using alternative HHCR measures and/or different subsamples. Our results support the
hypotheses made as detailed below.
Home Host Country Relatedness is Asymmetric
To test our asymmetry hypothesis, we first examine partial correlations, after
controlling for home and host country, between HHCRij and HHCRji for all country pairs
for which both measures are available. HHCRij and HHCRji are available in both
directions for 7,140/6441/3484/ pairs of countries for the Full/FDI/FPI Samples
respectively and their partial correlations are .32/.27/.32 respectively. These correlations
drop in the corrected sample to .12/.15/-.05 in the corrected samples with
2,763/2565/1044 country pairs.
We then test more formally for asymmetry using paired t-tests of means (reported
in Table 2). The t-tests for HHCRij(Full) vs. HHCRji(Full) and HHCRij(FDI) vs. HHCRji(FDI) are significant both in uncorrected and corrected samples, while no significance is
found for the test HHCRij(FPI) vs. HHCRji(FPI). These results show that albeit HHCRij
and HHCRij are correlated, their correlations are low and their means significantly
different, supporting H1 or country relatedness asymmetry for the Full and FDI Samples.
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Table 2: Paired Two-tailed t-tests for the Asymmetry Hypothesis (H1)
Difference
HHCRij(Full) –
HHCRji (Full)
HHCRij(FDI) –
HHCRji (FDI)
HHCRij(FPI) –
HHCRji (FPI)

Uncorrected Samples
Mean
Mean
t-value*)
HHCRij HHCRji

Obs.

Corrected Samples
Mean
Mean
HHCRij HHCRji

t-value*)

Obs.

-.71

-.74

3.012**

7,140

-2618

-.3181

3.015**

2,763

-.71

-.74

3.686**

6,441

-.27

-.34

3.6914**

2,565

-.77

-.78

1.2371†

3,484

-.23

-.27

1.2373†

1,044

* Ha: mean (diff)≠0

HHCR Differs for FDI vs. Portfolio Investments
To test H2, we also compare partial correlations of HHCRij(FDI) with
HHCRij(FPI), after controlling for home and host country. This correlation is .31
(significant at less than 1%) with 11,154 matched home-host pairs but drops to .19 in the
corrected sample with 3,839 pairs. We then test more formally for differences between
FDI and FPI using a paired mean t-test, which finds the differences in these measures to
be significant at less than 1%. The results, shown in Table 3, support H2 indicating
HHCRij(FDI) is significantly different than HHCRij(FPI).

Table 3: Paired Two-tailed t-tests for the FDI vs. Portfolio Investments Hypothesis
Difference
HHCRij(FDI) –
HHCRij(FPI)
HHCRij (FDI) –
HHCRij (Full)
HHCRij (FPI) –
HHCRij (Full)

Uncorrected Samples

Corrected Samples

Mean (1)

Mean (2)

t-value

Obs.

Mean (1) Mean (2) t-value

-.6690

-.8389

32.6

11,154

-.0384

-.5319

36.08

3,839

-.7964

-.7840

-13.04

23,133

.0125

.0742

-13.23

4,652

-.8455

-.6616

-39.5

11,687

-.5377

.0126

-46.09

3,905

* Ha: mean (diff)≠0; All tests significant at less than 1%.
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Obs.

HHCR is Impacted by Host Country Connectedness (HCC) to the Rest of the World
To test H3, we run OLS regressions using the model described in Equation 2, with
the dependent variable being HHCRij for the Full, FDI, and FPI Samples. To allow for
comparisons across the models, we used balanced datasets, keeping only observations
where data for all variables was available. As shown in Table 4, Models M1 and M2
demonstrate that host country connectedness (measured by HCCi) was positive and
highly significant for all three samples, after controlling for home and host country
effects. HCCi explained approximately an additional 3 to 4% of the variance in HHCRij.
In models M3 to M5, we added the scales of psychic distance (Dow & Karunaratna,
2006) as control variables, which reduced our samples to 6,407, 6,229, and 4,434 for the
Full/FDI/FPI Samples respectively. The estimated coefficients of connectedness however
remained positive and highly significant. Moreover, Wald-tests were highly significant,
suggesting that removing HHCi from the models substantially harms their fit. These
results support H3, demonstrating that the degree to which a host country is connected
with other countries positively affects the decisions of MNCs to invest in that country.
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Table 4: Explaining HHCR by Host Country Connectedness
M1

HHCRij(Full)
M2
M3
M4
M5
0.31**
0.19**
-0.06** -0.07**
-0.11** -0.11**

HCCj
Diff. in religion
Diff. in education
Diff. in industr.
develop.
Diff. in languages
Diff. in POLCON
Diff in POLITY IV
Diff. in the Political
Rights
Diff. in the Civil
Liberties
Diff. in Political
Ideology
Constant
-0.79** -0.87** -0.64**
Observations
24352 24352 6407
Adj. R-Squared
F-test
Home countries
Host countries

-0.09*

M1

HHCRij(FDI)
M2
M3
M4
M5
0.3**
0.19**
-0.05** -0.06**
-0.1** -0.11**

-0.03

-0.1*

-0.14** -0.14**
0.02
0.07
-0.01 -0.008

-0.03

-0.14** -0.14**
0.02
0.09
-0.01 -0.01

-0.0006 -0.0005

M1

HHCRij(FPI)
M2
M3
M4
M5
0.32**
0.25**
-0.03† -0.04**
-0.1** -0.1**
-0.05

-0.02

-0.1** -0.08**
-0.28** -0.2*
-0.01 0.002

0.007

0.005

-0.007

-0.01

0.07*

0.07*

0.07*

0.06*

0.05†

0.05**

0.005

0.02

0.004

0.02

-0.08*

-0.02

-0.64** -0.72** -0.8** -.87** -0.64** -0.64** -0.73** -0.85** -0.91** -0.76** -0.74** -0.83**
6407
6407 23133 23133 6229
6229
6229 11687 11687 4434
4434
4434
0.3308
0.1733 0.2063 0.2583 0.3505 0.3547 0.1838 0.2165 0.2723 0.3654 0.3697 0.1498 0.1880 0.2373 0.3004
9
17.22*
169.1*
146.3*
152.1*
7.72**
7.18**
*
*
*
*
120
120
72
72
72
114
114
70
70
70
88
88
60
60
60
204
204
90
90
90
204
204
90
90
90
134
134
75
75
75

† significant at 0.1, * significant at 0.05, **significant at 0.01
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Finally, to test H4, we compare HHCRij to BHCRij. Reasoning that a firm can use
an existing FDI as a bridge or an existing portfolio investment as a bridge (although
possibly less likely), we also compare HHCRij(FDI) and BHCRij(FPI), and HHCRij(FPI)
and BHCRij(FDI). The correlations between HHCRij to BHCRii for the uncorrected
samples are not high but significant, with values of .17/.19/.14 when both measures being
compared are based on Full/FDI/FPI Samples. The correlations for the pairs
HHCRij(FDI)/BHCRij(FPI) and HHCRij(FPI)/BHCRij(FDI) were .21/.15 for the
uncorrected samples and .07/.17 for the corrected ones.
We then test more formally for asymmetry using one-tailed paired mean t-tests,
i.e. testing whether HHCRij<BHCRij as the alternative hypothesis. As shown in Table 5,
all the t-tests are significant (p<.01) indicating that HHCRij is smaller than BHCRij. The
mean HHCRij for the 24,352 observations is -.79, while the mean BHCRij is .03. Put
differently, BHCRij relatedness is greater than HHCRij for 79.1% of all home-host
country pairs, is equal in 16.52% of the cases, and is lower for 4.4% of observations.
Using corrected samples, we get very similar results. We also conduct more conservative
tests, in which we omit all observations for which the direct measure was equal to -1 and
had the same results. These results support H4 indicating that relatedness via a bridging
country is often greater than the relatedness from the home to a host country.
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Table 5: Paired One-tailed t-tests for the Bridge Hypothesis
Uncorrected samples

Difference
HHCRij(Full) –
BHCRij(Full)
HHCRij(FDI) –
BHCRij(FDI)
HHCRij(FPI) –
BHCRij(FPI)
HHCRij(FDI) –
BHCRij(FPI)
HHCRij(FPI) –
BHCRij(FDI)

Corrected samples

Mean
HCRij

Mean
BHCRij

t-value

Obs. #

Mean
DM

Mean
IM

tvalue

Obs. #

-.79

.03

-200

24,352

-.75

.23

-250

20,330

-.80

0.02

-200

23,133

-.76

.21

-250

19,384

-.84

-.33

-80.96

11,503

-.72

.21

-110

6,388

-.67

-.31

-53.3

11,173

-.46

.14

-58.3

6,804

-.84

.21

-200

11,154

-.83

.27

-240

10,700

All tests significant at less than .01

Post-Hoc Analyses and Robustness Checks
We conducted several post-hoc analyses and robustness checks of our hypotheses
using different versions of the measures and/or different subsamples.
In our main measure of relatedness, we count investments made by firms from
country i in host country j. A possible drawback of this measure is that some firms tend to
consolidate their subsidiaries in a particular country into one, so differences may only
represent firm administrative differences rather than actual country relatedness.
Therefore, we examined two alternative measures.
The first measure, like our main measure, is based on counting. However, it
calculates home-host country relatedness using a count of MNCs rather than a count of
investments. In this case, we counted the number of MNCs from country i that have at
least one investment in country j regardless of the level of involvement in that country. A
potential drawback of this measure is that counting MNCs might bias the results against
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country pairs that have a big market as a host country, since in such countries it would be
expected that MNCs operate with multiple subsidiaries.
The second resembles the main measure in that it is calculated based on
investments rather than MNCs. But unlike the main measure, it takes into account the
level of ownership and calculates the weighted number of investments using the
percentages of ownership as weights. The problem with this measure is that it assumes a
linear relationship between the percentage ownership and importance. Moreover,
ownership data are harder to obtain and maintaining the same standards of reliability
worldwide is difficult.
The three alternative measures (base plus two robustness measures) were used for
the Full sample, FDI sample, and Portfolio Investments sample. The correlations between
the measures were high (above .9 for the FDI sample; above .7 for the Portfolio
Investments sample; and above .8 for the Full sample) even when we used the corrected
samples. Together with the significant differences between FDI- and FPI-based measures
reported earlier, these results suggest that our measures have both convergent and
discriminant validity.
Using different measures of relatedness for the asymmetry hypothesis produced
similar correlations between HHCSij and HHCSji (around .31). The results were also
confirmed when we applied different measures to the FDI or FPI uncorrected
(correlations between .26 and .28) or corrected samples (the correlations are all less than
.1). Results of the t-tests did not change.
Our finding that country relatedness depends on the type of investment (FDI vs.
Portfolio Investment) is also robust across different measures of country relatedness. In
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all potential combinations of measures of HHCRij(FDI) with measures of HHCRij(FPI)
the correlations remain from .4 to .42 (uncorrected samples) and from .06 to .14
(corrected samples). Results also are confirmed in t-tests. In addition, we checked
whether the results were sensitive to the operational definition of FDI and FPI
investments, by using alternative cut-off points for the percentage of ownership (40% and
20%). Considering that the ownership level for most investments was below 20% (45%
of the investments) or above 50% (around 52% of all investments), the measures were
not strongly affected. The correlation analysis and t-tests using measures based on the
alternative FDI- and FPI-samples confirmed our original results.
In terms of H3, we run the same models using different measures of the
dependent variable and the results were the same. We considered also two different
operational definitions for HCR, one that takes the FDI-stocks as a percentage of the
world as weights and another where host countries were given the same weight. The
results were consistent with the ones reported. Besides using Dow and Karunaratna
(2006) scales of psychic distance, we included also geographic distance and contiguity,
legal systems distance, previous colonial links and whether the countries in the dyad had
been part of the same country in the past. The models explain between 45% and 46% of
the variance in HHCRij for the Full and FDI samples, and around 35% for the FPI
sample. The connectedness effects remained positive and significant in all samples (pvalue <.05 for the Full sample and <.01 for the other two samples).
With regard to H4, our findings remained unchanged when we used the
alternative measures of HHCR and applied them to different samples.
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Discussion and Conclusion
We defined in this study home-host country relatedness for international
investments as the degree to which countries are efficiently combined within the
investment portfolios of real firms run by actual managers. This conceptualization departs
from past work in four ways. First, it focuses on revealed relatedness rather than its
elements such as culture (e.g., Kogut & Singh, 1988). Second, it does not make the
assumption that country relatedness is independent of firms, their resource bundles, and
competitive interaction. Third, our concept is value neutral allowing for differences
among countries to function as impediments and/or drivers of complementary
combinations (see Drogendijk & Zander, 2010: 192). Finally, it takes a dyadic approach
that emphasizes the previously made asymmetry assumption (see Shenkar, 2001). By
giving firms a central role in the conceptualization of relatedness, we follow the footsteps
of Shenkar et al. (2008) who propose a shift from “distance” to “friction” in intercultural
research, or Tallman (1992: 465) who emphasizes the notion that strategies, in this case
international investments, are chosen ‘by all-too-human managers to fit certain FSRs
(Firm Specific Resources) to a perceived market.’
We also demonstrated that HHCR is asymmetric since differing national factors,
including formal and informal institutions, economic factors, and national path
dependencies, lead to numerous differences in firms and individuals such as differing
perceptions, motivations, and preferences. These differences are ultimately likely to be
reflected in differing strategies and patterns of foreign investments by firms between any
pair of countries and also in differing success rates. Our theoretical arguments are in line
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with previous scholars who noted problems with symmetry in general (e.g., Tversky,
1977) and specifically with respect to cultural distance (e.g., Chapman et al., 2008;
Shenkar, 2001; Tung & Verbeke, 2010). The empirical results are also consistent with
observed asymmetries in various functional areas of MNC-management such as
expatriate deployment (Brock et al., 2008) and adjustment (Selmer et al., 2007), control
modes of cooperation (Lee, Shenkar, & Li, 2008), and joint venture control and
performance (Luo et al., 2001). Our results also argue for the need to truly consider both
country distance and country relatedness as asymmetric in international business
research.
We also proposed that country relatedness varies with the type of investments
made and the connectedness of the host country to the rest of the world, because of the
differing motivations behind such investments. Our results are in line with existing
research which argues that despite the co-existence of FDI and FPI and their common
features (Dilyard, 2001; Dunning & Dilyard, 1999), substantial differences exist among
them (Buckley & Casson, 1976; Busse & Hefeker, 2007; Dunning, 1980; Guerin, 2006;
Hymer, 1976; Rugman, 1975; Wilkins, 1999: 99-100).
Finally, we demonstrated that home-host country relatedness is positively
associated with the connectedness of the host country, and the degree to which it
potentially serves as a bridge to other countries. These results are consistent with
Hedlund’s (1986) discussion of the heterarchical MNC rather than traditional views of
the MNC (e.g., Egelhoff, 1988; Stopford & Wells, 1972) which underlie current views of
country relatedness. In this view, the parent serves as a hub and the only center with
investments, knowledge and control flowing through the spokes to the subsidiaries. This
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view still holds partially true considering the control maintained by the parent (Egelhoff,
1988; Newburry & Zeira, 1999); however, we now understand that the modern MNC
may not have a single center or hub and that the connections among the subsidiaries are
much more complex (Ambos, Andersson & Birkinshaw, 2010; Birkinshaw, Hood &
Jonsson, 1998). Recent research has highlighted the fact that subsidiaries play roles that
involve various degrees of centrality within MNC networks (Monteiro, Arvidsson, &
Birkinshaw, 2004; Newburry, 2000), which vary with their host country.
These findings are also in line with research on ‘betweenness’ in network theory
(e.g., Krackhardt, 1990; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Subsidiaries indeed can and do
function as a bridge (Granovetter, 1973), helping firms in their internationalization
process by establishing a foothold in a region and assisting firms in developing
capabilities (e.g., Parada et al., 2009). In fact, we demonstrate that the shortest distance
between two countries is often via a bridging third country, which is in line with our
observations of MNCs using particular countries as a launch pad for expansion in a
particular region (Buckley & Gauri, 2004).
In addition to these theoretical contributions, we propose an index of home-host
country relatedness that is complementary to current input-based indices of country
distance. Developments in research and data availability allow us to provide a method for
capturing country relatedness that incorporates the judgment and knowledge of the firms
which make international investment decisions. The indices and methods for their
calculation make a significant empirical contribution to the country relatedness research,
allowing comprehensive examination of home-host country relatedness, using a large
sample of countries, which is a key strategy for improving IB research generalization
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(Franke & Richey, 2010). The study offers indices of relatedness for up to 24,592 homecountry pairs involving more than 200 countries, compared for example to distance
studies using the 56 countries for which Hofstede’s dimensions are available or the 62
societies within the GLOBE study.
The indices presented capture a multidimensional concept (Pehrsson 2006,
Stimpert & Duhaime 1997), but are free of researchers’ bias since they will not require
combining different elements of relatedness into an index with predefined weights (Lien
& Klein, 2009). The indices proposed however are not context free. They build on actual
international investments made by firms, following Kostova’s (1996) suggestion of
focusing on a particular context, which allows for better measurement, albeit limiting
generalizability.
We propose in this study to examine country relatedness in addition to country
distance. Considering that country relatedness is multidimensional and complex, we
proposed in this study that it is best observed in use. This conceptualization is novel
(focusing on the outcome of country relatedness rather than its drivers) and takes into
account the asymmetric nature of country relatedness. We also argued that even when
focusing on international investments, HHCR is likely to vary with firms’ motivations,
which are likely to differ for FDI and FPI. Countries that are more connected to the rest
of the world will be more attractive as hosts.
While resource requirements often vary for FPI and FDI leading to a differing
HHCR, they also vary in a number of other instances. For example, FDI for the purpose
of R&D may require a different resource redeployment than FDI for the purpose of sales
or manufacturing, an issue that we leave for future research. Moreover, our focus is on
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international investments made by firms. As suggested by Shenkar (2001), home-host
country relatedness for expatriate movement may be different. Future research needs to
also explore how input-driven measures of country distance drive our home-host country
relatedness, which is clearly output-based. For example, does psychic distance drive
relatedness or for which sets of country pairs is psychic distance an important driver of
home-host country relatedness?
In addition to the theoretical contributions highlighted above, we propose an
index of home-host country relatedness that is complementary to current input-based
indices, allowing comparison across a large number of countries. Our methodology
recognizes that relatedness is subject to change and allows for a systematic updating. The
methodology proposed also offers the possibility for replication in other contexts, such as
relatedness for international country relations or trade. Both would be fascinating areas
for future research. Albeit our study has not addressed home-host country relatedness in
all contexts it will potentially benefit future international business research by allowing
for comparisons across countries around the globe. It may also help practitioners
determine the likelihood of their international investments’ success, keeping in mind that
competitive factors may change the level of the indices proposed in the future.
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III. COUNTRY EMBEDDEDNESS, MANAGERIAL BIASES AND
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DECISIONS

Introduction
While most researchers acknowledge economic factors as key drivers of
international investment decisions, models of strategic decisions and especially the
standard internalization model tend to be hyper-rational, indicating directly or indirectly
that firm decisions are driven by the state of relevant decision factors (Aharoni, 2010;
Buckley, Devinney & Louviere, 2007).

In contrast, decision-making research has

emphasized the bounded rationality of decision makers and their systematic reliance on
heuristics and biases that are often universal or shared among country nationals (Jones &
Wadhwani, 2007; Schneider & De Meyer, 1991). To bridge this gap, we build on current
research in cognitive psychology to propose a decision-making theory that we apply in
the context of international investments.
We first propose that international investment decisions, as all other decisions, are
generally made close to convenient anchors, and that a key anchor for international
investment decisions, and the focus of this study, is firms’ home country factors with host
countries chosen to be ‘close’ to the home country. We draw on past work to identify
country factors that may determine closeness in addition to economic factors. We group
these factors into two categories: i) historical and time invariant factors, such as
geographic distance or colonial ties, which are likely to remain static over time, and
typically have not changed in the last fifty years, and ii) time varying institutional factors,
typically changing on a yearly basis and likely to have changed in the last ten years. Time
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invariant factors include the geographic location as well as relatively stable country
characteristics related among others to language, religion, colonial history, and legal
systems. Time-variant institutions are primarily regulatory in their nature and can be
changed more frequently, including institutions of property rights protection, contracting,
and those that regulate corporate governance. Building on further research on memory
imprinting from psychology, we then propose that managers tend to rely on older
knowledge representation and hence international investment decisions are likely to rely
more strongly on time-invariant institutional factors.
Drawing on a database of over half a million investments by most public MNEs
worldwide, or over 15,000 firms, we find support for our claims. Country factors are
indeed a shared anchor that drives investment decisions by firms from any particular
home country to any particular host country. Alternatively, firms select international
investments sites that that are ‘close’ to their home country. These findings are in line
with the work of Ghemawat (2001, 2003) on “semi-globalization” and Rugman’s on
“regionalization” (Rugman &Verbeke, 2004; Rugman, 2005) suggesting that, despite the
hype, globalization may not be as prevalent as perceived. We also find that closeness of
time-variant institutions have little explanatory power in comparison to closeness to time
invariant factors, in explaining the overall pattern of home-host international investment
decisions.

This finding confirms the role of ancient history to current decisions

(Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005, Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001), and more
generally, the importance of time invariant factors (Blonigen, Davies, Waddell, &
Naughton, 2007), such as geography, which have mostly fallen out of favor in strategy
and international business research.

More generally, our findings calls for further
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inclusion of managerial cognition research into strategy and international business (IB)
research.

Literature Review
Local Search, Anchoring and Decision Making
Research on bounded rationality (March & Simon, 1958; Nelson, 2008; Simon,
1955, 1976), cognitive limitations, biases, and heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973,
1974) and further applications of these concepts suggests that both individuals and firms
choose solutions that are proximate to their anchors, which in turn are chosen based on
easily available information (e.g., Corner, Kinicki, & Keats, 1994; Olie & Iterson, 2004).
Further details are given below.
Humans are hence boundedly rational (Halford, Wilson, Guo, Gayler, Wiles, &
Stewart, 1994; Simon, 1957) and they use simplifying heuristics, which “reduce the
complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental
operations” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974: 1124). Tversky and colleagues demonstrated
the systematic presence of the ‘availability and anchoring’ heuristics, which lead to
solutions close to the initial position, which also has found support from neuroimaging
research (Tamir& Mitchell, 2010). Anchors themselves are chosen based on the
information available with individuals relying heavily on information that is easily
recalled when making frequency or probability assessments (Tversky & Kahneman,
1974). Subsequent adjustments are then biased toward the initial values (Chapman &
Johnson, 2002; Epley & Gilovich, 2006; Kahneman, 2003; Schwenk, 1984; Tversky &
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Kahneman, 1974). Evidence of anchoring has been found in numerous setting such as
risk perception (Keller, Siegrist, & Gutscher, 2006) and doctors’ decisions about
diagnosis and prescribing (Klein, 2005). In a more market-like context, anchoring effects
have been demonstrated in auction/negotiation situations (Galinsky, Ku, & Mussweiler,
2009), entrepreneurial market entry decisions (Moore, Oesch, & Zietsma, 2007), and
other.
Local search is not just a characteristic of individuals, but also organizations,
which “(1) search in the neighborhood of the problem symptom and (2) search in the
neighborhood of the current alternative” (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963: 121; Gavetti &
Levinthal, 2000) and begin their search by examining the data most readily available
(Moore et al., 2007). Firms resort to local search in the development of organizational
routines and more broadly organizational learning (e.g., Levitt & March, 1988; March,
1991; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Simon, 1991). Research in the ‘upper echelons’ tradition
(e.g., Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004; Hambrick & Mason, 1984) has also
demonstrated that top managers’ background, experiences, and values influence strategic
decisions including corporate change (Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994), product
diversification (Farjoun & Lai, 1997; Pehrsson, 2006; Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997),
international diversification (Tihanyi, Ellstrand, Daily, & Dalton, 2000), and product
innovation (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000).
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Theory Development
Country Embeddedness, Local Search and Country Anchoring
Focusing on international investment decisions, we propose that a key
environmental anchor for international investment decisions will be the firm’s home
country and firms will choose for international investments countries which are ‘close’ to
their own home country. As detailed below, two considerations drive this proposition.
First, firms’ top executives are still primarily drawn from firms’ home countries (e.g.,
Jones, 2006) and country nationals are proven to share numerous decision-making traits
(e.g., Schneider & De Meyer, 1991). Second, executives’ knowledge of the firm’s
external environment constitutes an important source of available information (Bouquet,
Morrison, & Birkinshaw, 2009; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), with the country being a
common anchor in the context of international investment decisions (e.g., Kogut, 1993).
Despite tremendous internationalization by firms over the last decades, boards of
directors, top management teams and especially CEOs still originate from the firm’s
home country with countable exceptions (e.g., Heijltjes, Olie, & Glunk, 2003; Jones,
2006, 2006a). For example, our own of the Fortune 250 U.S. companies showed that only
seven of them had a non-American national at the helm in 2005. Even at the board of
directors level, or that level which is most international, many studies demonstrate, the
number of non-nationals is larger (e.g., Ruigrok, Peck, & Tacheva, 2007) but is still
relatively small and changing very slowly (Gillies & Dickinson, 1999; Staples, 2007).
Differences in national cultures have been shown to lead to different styles of
processing information (Schneider 1989) and different interpretations and responses to
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similar strategic issues (Schneider & De Meyer 1991). These differences also lead to the
use of different criteria and weightings in making strategic decision (Hitt, Dacin, Tyler, &
Park, 1997). Executives’ knowledge of the firm’s external environment constitutes an
important source of available information (Bouquet, Morrison, & Birkinshaw, 2009;
Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), with firms manned by executive that share the same nationality
likely to rely on similar information and similar anchors.
In addition, research has shown that the country is likely to be a common anchor
in the context of international investment decisions. Firms are embedded in a larger
institutional context that serves as a powerful influence on strategic decisions (Hitt et al.,
1997) and strategic orientation (Chung & Lee, 1989). Dunning speaks about MNC’s
“ownership advantages” that are in part home nation-specific (1977) and Kogut stresses
that ”countries differ in their underlying 'organizing principles' of work” so firms within a
country “share common heuristics” which “embodies the know-how defining a country's
capabilities” (Kogut, 1991: 33). National institutional factors are also found to lead to
diversification patterns that are “country-specific” (Kogut, Walker, & Anand, 2002).
Additionally, we observe significant differences in international entry decisions,
operation and management of international subsidiaries in the case of multinational firms
(Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991). In fact, a review by business historian Geoffrey Jones
(2006, 2006a) concludes that firms’ nationality has become more important in the recent
decades compared to the end of nineteenth century.
Considering that firms manned by executive that share the same nationality are
likely to rely on similar information and similar anchors, we propose that this anchor is
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less likely to be firm or industry specific but rather country-specific. More formally, we
propose the following:
Proposition 1a: A key environmental anchor for international investment
decisions will be the firm’s home country.
Considering also that top executives’ attention is in short supply, they cannot
attend to all the signals that matter (Bouquet et al., 2009), so the solutions chosen are
likely to be chosen close to a firm’s current position. We hence propose that firms are
likely to choose host countries that are ‘close’ to their home country. Firms from any one
country are likely to use heuristics that are shared with other firms in that country, or
national collective heuristics, leading to similar decisions across firms from any one
country. Ultimately, the aggregated investment decisions of individual firms at the
country level indicate that the choice of host countries is driven by similarity/closeness to
the home country. More formally:
Proposition 1b: Firms are more likely to choose countries that are similar/close to
their home country in making international investment locational decisions.

Older Versus Recent Information and Decision Making
Going back to research on decision-making, we also find solid evidence for
systematic memory imprinting in addition to anchoring in decision making. Recent
research in this area indicates that in making decisions (Bjork, 2001), individuals are
more likely to rely on historical and time invariant rather than current information.
Cognitive psychology research is slowly documenting the biology and mechanisms of the
brain, suggesting that earlier memory representations and learning become more
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available over time. Information and learning acquired early on in life is more likely to
be stored in long-term memory and more likely to be used (Suprenant & Heath, 2009)
suggesting that managerial decisions, especially those by the more senior upper echelons
members, are more likely to rely on relevant historical information. “(O)ver time, access
to competing memory representations regresses toward the older of those
representations” (Bjork, 2001: 222).
A multitude of experiments point to a shift from recency to primacy in the ease of
access to memory representations corresponding to events or items as time passes, be it
for remembering lists of items (Knoedler, Hellwig, & Neath, 1999) or recalling events
from different periods (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). In a more market-like
situation, finance research on stock market reactions has revealed a tendency toward
under-reaction among investors to newly released information (Della Vigna, 2009;
Huberman & Regev, 2001).
In addition to the reliance on older memory representation, individuals are more
likely to recall information that is consistent with the categories in use (Nisbett & Ross,
1980; Dutton & Jackson, 1987). Solidified values and mental frames are used not only
for data collection, but also for analysis (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982: 557). Judgments made
once on the grounds of historical information might also be used as a basis for later
judgments, independent of the information on which the judgments were originally based
(e.g., Kiesler & Sproull, 1982; Lingle & Ostrom, 1979). Data from these judgments gets
incorporated into the strategy, systems, values, and expectations, and reinforced behavior
of the organization (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995: 7). This phenomena is likely to be
exacerbated considering i) the limited number of cues or pieces of information that can be
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used in decision making (e.g., Tyler & Steensma, 1995: 61), ii) the greater level of
experience of top management teams and hence a greater likelihood of deeply set mental
models (Musteen, Barker, & Baeten, 2006). In this same vein, Prahalad and Bettis (1986)
emphasized the relevance of historical factors as antecedents of the managerial dominant
logic.
Ultimately, the mental representations which managers use are more likely to
based on historical information (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982: 557). We draw on this research,
described below, to propose that firms are more likely to use historical and time-invariant
factors in determining closeness and ultimately international investment locational
choices. Formally:
Proposition 2: Firms are more likely to use historical / time invariant information
in making decisions.

Country Anchoring and International Investment Decisions
If country closeness is a key determinant of international investment decisions,
what exactly determines closeness? Moreover, which would be the time variant versus
time invariant factors that are likely to influence firms’ decision? While economic factors
have been emphasized by all as important, different authors and different streams of
research have focused on the importance of different additional national elements. While
we highlight briefly some of these different approaches below, we chose to follow the
CAGE-framework (Ghemawat, 2001) which stands for culture, administration,
geography and economic and straddles both macroeconomic and international business,
highlighting the importance of both time-invariant factors and national institutions.
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Macroeconomic research has paid close attention to numerous country specific
factors that are primarily of time-invariant nature, including geographic proximity and
contiguity, similarity in religion, historical colonial ties, shared language, and common
legal roots (e.g., Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet, & Mayer 2007; Hu, 1995; Nicita & Olarreaga,
2007; Martin, Mayer, & Thoenig, 2008). The gravity models in which these factors are
studied (e.g., Anderson, 1979; Tinbergen, 1962) trace back to the Heckscher-Ohlin model
of trade theory (e.g., Leamer, 1995) and subsequent formal horizontal (Markusen, 1984)
and vertical (Helpman, 1984) models of FDI. These models posit that, like the gravity
law in physics, the economic interaction between any two countries is positively related
to their economic ‘mass’ and negatively to the ‘distance’ between two countries in the
factors below (e.g., Ricart et al., 2004). While these models seek to explain inter-country
patterns and do not speak about the managers making individual firm decisions, we
believe they identify the time-invariant country factors that are likely to be key anchors in
the mind of managers as they make international investment decisions.
Within international business research has increasingly paid attention to national
factors (e.g., Chacar & Vissa, 2005) with different streams of literature emphasizing
different national factor. For example, one classification has used the product, financial
and labor market institutions (e.g., Chacar, Newbury & Vissa, 2010; Khanna & Palepu,
1997). Guillén and Suárez (2005) identify five main approaches to the study of
institutional context of multinational activity: cross-cultural (Hofstede, 1980, 1991;
Kogut & Singh, 1988), comparative authority and business systems (Whitley, 1992;
Zaheer & Zaheer, 1997), political economy of FDI (Gereffi, 1989, 1990), comparative
corporate legal traditions (Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 2008; Capron &
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Guillén, 2009; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; La Porta, Lopezde-Silanes, Shleifer, 1999), and political and contractual hazards (Delios & Henisz, 2000;
Henisz & Williamson, 1999; Henisz, 2000, 2000a). Other authors emphasize the
importance of combining different dimensions (Berry et al., 2010; Dow & Karunaratna,
2006). Others have focused on the three pillars highlighted by Scott (1995), regulative,
normative and cognitive (e.g., Kostova, 1996, 1999; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). Within
that approach much of the attention has focused on the regulative aspects with much
attention being paid to the political hazards and comparative corporate legal traditions
(Cantwell, Dunning, & Lundan, 2010; Capron & Guillén, 2009). These literatures suggest
that firms are more likely to seek foreign investments in countries with similar
contracting institutions, because of institution specific-capabilities developed within the
firm and the MNE’s ability to transfer best practices to the new institutional regimes
(Guillén & Suárez, 2005).
We have tried to be comprehensive in our coverage and use the factors
highlighted in past research, but grouped the factors differently into two categories in line
with our theory i) historical and time invariant factors, such as geographic distance or
colonial ties, which are likely to remain static over time, and typically have not changed
in the last fifty years, and ii) time varying institutional factors, typically changing on a
yearly basis and likely to have changed in the last ten years. We expand on the specifics
of these factors’ relationships to international investments below.
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Historical and Time Invariant Factors and International Investment Decisions
We classified under time invariant factors, the geographic proximity and
contiguity as well as historical and cultural factors such as language, religion, colonial
relationships, and legal systems.
Geographic proximity. Both geographic proximity and geographic contiguity can
increase the likelihood of international investments for several different reasons. These
factors can foster communication (e.g., Frankel, Stein, & Wei, 1997) and reduce
transportation and communication costs (e.g., Chandler, 1977, 2000; Dunning & Lundan,
2008; Krugman, 1991; Yates, 2000). Moreover, neighboring and proximate countries are
likely to be more salient in the minds of managers (Sjöholm, 1996; Wanta, Golan, & Lee,
2004).
Common language. Language is a highly time-invariant informal norm (North,
1990; Williamson, 2000) that seems to be an important attractor for investors and for
business success, even in the case of trade, which is expected to be less influenced by
language (Ghemawat, 2001).
Colonial relationships. Historical country relationships are often the source of
formal and informal institutions that remain into the present (Acemoglu & Johnson,
2005), leading to otherwise unexpected patterns such as high levels of intraCommonwealth trade and investment not explainable by regional trade agreements or
geographical proximity (Lundan & Jones, 2001).
Same Country Historically. Countries that were in the past part of the same
country, such as the former Soviet Union, present numerous historical and institutional
similarities (Luong, 2002: 2).

53

Legal system origins. Legal system origins lead to significant differences in
business and consumer related regulations and in the extent to which they provide
shareholder and creditor protection and preserve the property rights (Djankov, La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2002, 2003; La Porta et al., 1998, La Porta et al., 1999).
Hence, common legal origins facilitate inter-country transactions (Flores & Aguilera,
2007; Globerman & Shapiro, 2003).
Religion. Differences in religion have the potential to disrupt the flow of
information for international business (eg. Dolansky & Alon, 2008; Dow & Karunaratna,
2006), because religion and values affect individual cognition and influence the
development of capitalism (Weber, 1930).
Based on the above, we propose that the following time-invariant country factors
will serve as anchors for international investments:
Hypothesis 1: Contiguous countries to the firm’s home country are more likely to
be chosen as foreign investment locations.
Hypothesis 2: Geographically distant countries from the firm’s home country are
less likely to chosen as foreign investment locations.
Hypothesis 3: Countries that share the same language as the firm’s home country
are more likely to be chosen as foreign investment locations.
Hypothesis 4: Countries that have historical colonial links to their firm’s home
country are more likely to be chosen as foreign investment locations.
Hypothesis 5: Countries that were part of a firm’s home country in the past are
more likely to be chosen as foreign investment locations.
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Hypothesis 6: Countries that have similar legal systems to their firm’s home
country are more likely to be chosen as foreign investment locations.
Hypothesis 7: Countries that have similar religions to their firm’s home country
are more likely to be selected as foreign investment locations.

Current and Time-Varying Institutions and International Investment Decisions
We classified under time-varying institutions those responsible for the protection
of property rights and contracting, institutions of corporate governance related to the
protection of shareholder and labor rights, and common membership in regional
agreements.
Property rights institutions. Property rights institutions are defined as “the rules
and regulations protecting citizens against the power of the government and elites”
(Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005: 955). These institutions may alter or control opportunistic
behavior and can help mitigate the public expropriation hazards (Delios & Henisz, 2000;
Henisz & Williamson, 1999). Considering the cost of dealing with differing property
rights regimes, firms are likely to prefer investing in countries with similar property
rights.
Contracting institutions. Contracting institutions are defined as “the rules and
regulations governing contracting between ordinary citizens” (Acemoglu & Johnson,
2005: 955). These institutions are essential in mitigating the risk of private expropriation
(Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; Delios & Henisz, 2000; Henisz & Williamson, 1999).
Considering these institutions influence the cost of doing business, firms are more likely
to seek countries with similar contracting institutions.
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Shareholders’ rights institutions. The degree to which shareholders’ rights are
legally protected varies significantly across countries (La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta et
al., 1999). These institutions affect the ability of a firm to utilize its capabilities and the
acceptance of its practices in countries with differing shareholder rights (Capron &
Guillén, 2009: 807).
Labor rights institutions. A similar argument can be made in the case of protection
of labor rights, which include the employment law, collective relations law, and social
security law (Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2004: 1339).
Labor force adjustments are harder to implement in countries with strict protection of
labor rights, increasing the costs of post-acquisition reorganization (Botero et al., 2004;
Capron & Guillén, 2009).
Common membership in regional agreements (CMRA). The foundation of
European Union (EU), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and other
major regional agreements, has resulted in the reduction of tariffs and other trade costs
which is expected to encourage investments among partner countries (e.g., Baltagi et al.,
2008; Brenton, 1996; Fratianni & Oh, 2009).
Based on the above, we propose that the following time-variant country factors
will serve as anchors for international investments:
Hypothesis 8: Countries with greater distance in property rights institutions from
the firm’s home country are less likely to be chosen as foreign investment locations.
Hypothesis 9: Countries with greater contracting institutions distance from the
firm’s home country are less likely to be chosen as foreign investment locations.
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Hypothesis 10: Countries with greater distance in shareholder protection from the
firm’s home country are less likely to be chosen as foreign investment locations.
Hypothesis 11: Countries with greater distance in labor protection from the
firm’s home country are less likely to be chosen as foreign investment locations.
Hypothesis 12: Countries which share membership in a regional agreement with
the firm’s home country are more likely to be chosen as foreign investment locations.

Country Embeddedness, Memory Imprinting and International Investment
Decisions
In line with our proposition 2 above, early international research and a large
strand of research in macroeconomics and political science have emphasized the
importance of historical and geographical factors to country relations, foreign direct
investments and trade (e.g., Dunning & Lundan, 2008). We argue that they will also be of
great importance in the context of international investment decisions.
The choice of location requires making judgments about similarities across
countries (e.g., Tallman & Shenkar, 1994). Such judgments are generally ambiguous in
nature (Farjoun & Lai, 1997), subject to cognitive biases in managerial perceptions
(Barnes, 1984; Schwenk, 1984) and are based on simplifications of complex information,
or categorizations (Dutton & Jackson, 1987). Such categories are likely to be based on
early acquisition of information which is often on time invariant historical and
geographic factors, such as neighbor countries, language, and religion, the elements
taught in the school and that individuals are exposed to during their whole life. Along
these lines, Jones and Wadhwani (2007) find that linguistic and historical ties affecting
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entrepreneurial cognition with international investments of Spanish firms, even from the
1980s and onward, being disproportionately located in Latin America. Categorizations
and framing also influence the perceptions of opportunities and threats. Tversky and
Kahneman (1981) and subsequent work (e.g., Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Kahneman, 2003)
showed that risk taking behaviors change depending on a situation’s framing. Along
these lines, Toral (2001) analyzes the investments of Spanish multinationals in Latin
America and points out that the perceptions in those instances were of greater
opportunities and lesser risks less than other regions or countries while the opposite was
true for U.S. multinationals. As a result there are relatively fewer investments by U.S.
multinationals in Latin America, despite the fact that they are better endowed than
Spanish multinationals (Toral, 2001: 171) and entry into the promising Latin American
market would make economic sense.
Ultimately, while many historic and geographic factors have fallen into disfavor
in the IB literature, we believe that these factors are likely to be the more salient in
managers’ minds. Our review suggests that in making international locational choices for
international diversification, just as in product diversification moves (Prahalad & Bettis,
1986), the choice of the target country is likely to be heavily influenced by historicgeographic or time invariant institutional knowledge rather than by current or time
varying institutional factors. As such, we propose that historic and geographic factors will
have the greater influence on internationalization decisions. More formally:
Hypothesis 13: Historical / time invariant country distance information is likely
to explain more of the variance in home host country international investment decisions
than distance of time variant institutions.
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Methods
Data used to test our hypotheses is already described in Chapter 1 (see Table 1 for
the full sample). In addition, we collected data on different national factors and
institutions. Because of missing country-level data and the fact that we used a balanced
dataset to run all models, we were left with 1,705 observations/country pairs with 56
home and 58 host countries represented.

Dependent Variable: Home-Host International Investments
We measured international investments as the relative level of firms’ investment
between a home and a host country, at the country dyad, which they also term HomeHost Country Relatedness (HHCRij) with i representing home country i and j host
country. This measure is based on the survivor-principle (SP) (Teece et al., 1994) that
assumes that countries that are frequently chosen or combined within actual firms are
more closely related than countries that are rarely combined, after making certain
adjustments. The aggregation of firms’ decisions in an overall measure seems
appropriate, considering that in our case the measurement of absolute properties of
members gives rise to collective properties (Schneider & Andelmar, 1993). Unlike
typical aggregate measures however this measure incorporates the judgment and
knowledge of the firms which make international investment decisions and is more
suitable to test theory on international investment decisions than similar measures based
on bilateral FDI-flows, since it’s not sensitive to the size of investments. The technical
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details of the calculation of this measure were described in Chapter I (see Equations 1
and 2).

Statistical Model
We used ordinary least squares methodology to test our Hypotheses 1 to 12 using
the model below and variance decomposition techniques to test for H13. We estimate
HHCRij, as follows:

HHCRij = α + β1 * (Economic Factors)ij + β2 * (Time Invariant Factors)ij + β3 *
(Time Variant Factors)ij+ controls
Equation 7: Statistical model for HHCRij

where β1 represents the effects of economic factors as controls,
β2 is a vector of coefficients capturing the effects of the various time invariant
factors,
β3 is a vector of coefficients capturing the effects of current factors.
Considering the dyadic nature of data, we assumed that the error within a country
is correlated and hence clustered the data by both the home and host country.

Independent Variables
All independent variables are at the country-pair level. They either represent a
distance, such as the difference in Distance in Shareholder Rights for a home and host
country, or a descriptor, such as the Geographic Distance between the two countries (see
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Appendix 3 for a full description of all variables). These measures used for time invariant
data have been commonly used in macro-economic research (e.g., Bénassy-Quéré,
Coupet, & Mayer 2007; Martin, Mayer, & Thoenig, 2008; Nicita & Olarreaga, 2007).
The measures for the time-variant factors were obtained from various sources from the IB
literature.

Control Variables
We controlled for fixed home and host country effects.

We also used several

controls for economic factors that may influence international investments. We controlled
for the Combined Size of the home and host countries measures as the log of the sum of
home and host countries GDP or G=GDPi+GDPj and home host Size similarity measured
by S=1–(GDPi/G)2–(GDPj/G)2. We also controlled for Combined Purchasing Power
measured by the log of the sum of home and host GDP per capita or
Gcapita=GDPcapitai+GDPcapitaj and Similarity in Purchasing Power measured by S=1–
(GDPcapitai/Gcapita)2–(GDPcapitaj/Gcapita)2. Additional controls are also made for
Human Capital Endowment Distance measured by the absolute value of the difference in
secondary school enrollment. This data was obtained from the World Development
Indicators. Finally, we control for the fact that one or more countries in the pairs is an
island with Island=2 for pairs of islands, 1 for one island country in pair, and 0 otherwise,
a factor that may interfere with geographic distance calculations.
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Results
Table 6 presents the summary statistics for our measures. The full correlation
matrix (See Table 7) shows several correlation indices above 0.3 among the independent
variables, albeit some of these are not surprising. We ran collinearity diagnostics,
computing the mean variance inflation factor (VIF) for all models estimated and it stood
at 1.51. All the individual VIFs were less than 4 with the maximum at 2.15, indicating
low collinearity (Netter, Wasserman & Kutner, 1996).
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics
Variables

Mean

St. Dev.

Min.

Max.

HHCRij
Combined Size
Size similarity
Distance in Work Force Quality
Combined GDP/capita
GDP/capita similarity
Island
Contiguous Countries
Geographic distance (100 km)
Common Official Language
Colonial Relations
Same Country
Distance in Legal Systems
Distance in Religion
Distance in Property Rights Protection
Distance in Contracting Institutions
Distance in Shareholder Rights
Distance in Labor Protection

-0.51
26.8
0.28
0.85
10.31
0.36
0.31
0.04
74.2
0.11
0.06
0.009
0.69
-0.3
0.2
1.07
1.1
0.85

0.58
1.29
0.16
0.75
0.64
0.13
0.5
0.19
47.75
0.31
0.24
0.09
0.72
0.94
0.21
0.8
0.83
0.63

-1
23.5
0.001
0
7.7
0.04
0
0
1.11
0
0
0
0
-1.55
0
0
0
0

1
30.43
0.5
4.42
11.42
0.5
2
1
197.7
1
1
1
2
1.53
0.89
4.09
3.54
3.05

Common Membership in Reg. Agreements

0.13

0.33

0

1
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Table 7: Correlations Matrix

Variable
(1) HHCRij
Contiguous
(2)
countries
Geographic
(3)
Distance
Common
(4) Official
Language
Colonial
(5)
Relations
(6) Same Country
Distance in
(7)
Legal Systems
Distance in
(8)
Religion
Distance in
Property
(9)
Rights
Protection
Distance in
(10) Shareholder
Rights
Distance in
(11) Labor
Protection
Distance in
(12) Contracting
Institutions
(13) CMRA

(1)
1

(2)

0.33*

1

-0.38* -0.26*

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

1

0.17* 0.15* 0.02

1

0.13* 0.14* -0.07* 0.35*

1

0.16* 0.35* -0.11* 0.19* 0.05*

1

-0.20* -0.17* 0.19* -0.15* -0.12* -0.08*

1

-0.16* -0.13* 0.08* -0.1* 0.07* -0.09* 0.1*
-0.09* -0.04 0.14* 0.03

1

0.03

-0.01 -0.004 -0.04

1

-0.02 -0.03 0.06* -0.07* 0.02

-0.02 0.08* 0.01

-0.05

-0.15* -0.11* 0.04* -0.15* -0.09* -0.09* 0.5* 0.07* 0.02

1
-0.01

1

-0.12* -0.08* 0.3* -0.11* -0.14* -0.04 0.24* -0.14* 0.09* 0.13* 0.07*

1

0.3* 0.23* -0.49* -0.05* -0.07* 0.09* -0.18* -0.25* -0.26* -0.01 -0.15* -0.12*

* significant at 5% or less
Table 8 shows the test results explaining HHCRij for both TI and TV, or H1 to
H12. M0 represents the base model with the control variables and fixed home and host
country effects. Model M1 tests hypotheses related to TI, i.e. H1 to H7, while model M2
tests hypotheses H8 to H12, which are related to TV. M3 is the full model. As an
illustration, the estimated coefficient for Geographic Distance is 0.003 (M1 in Table 8).
Therefore, a reduction of distance of one unit (100 km) causes an increase of HHCRij, by
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.003. This in turn translates (for a pair of countries that have HHCRij = .5) in an increase
of 2% of the number of investments in the host country.
We find highly significant effects and in the predicted direction for almost all
geographic and historical factors (H1 to H7) except Same Country (when entered
individually also Same Country has a significant positive). Countries have a higher level
of relative investments, or ‘are more related’, if they are contiguous or close
geographically, have had colonial relations, and are similar in terms of religion, legal
systems, and language.
We have more mixed results for time varying institutions (M2). Distance in
Property Rights Protection (H8) has a positive rather the expected negative effect HHCRij
albeit that effect is near marginal in the full model. Distance in Contracting Institutions
(H9) has a negative and significant effect on HHCRij but loses significance in the full
model. Distance in Shareholder Rights (H10) has a positive coefficient on HHCRij that
becomes significant and positive in the full model, which is contrary to our predictions.
Distance in Labor Protection (H11) has a negative and significant effect on HHCRij but
loses significance in the full model. Common Membership in Regional Agreements
(CMRA) (H12) has as expected a positive effect HHCRij albeit that effect is nonsignificant in the full model.
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Table 8: OLS Results Explaining HHCRij: M1: Time Invariant; M2: Time Varying
M0

M1

M2

M3

Combined size

.03(1.67)†

.05(2.34)*

.05(2.04)*

0.05(2.61)*

Size similarity

.16(1.34)

.21(1.9)†

.18(1.44)

.22(2.23)*

Distance in Work Force Quality

-.06(-1.31)

-.07(-1.73)†

-.41(-.92)

-.07(-1.88)*

Combined GDP/capita

-.02(-.31)

-.23(-0.44)

-.05(-1)

-.01(-0.25)†

GDP/capita similarity

.38(1.7)†

-.08(-.5)

.14(.64)

-.08(-.05)

Island

.02(.43)

.02(0.51)

Contiguous Countries (H1)

.06(6.06)***

.58(5.86)***

Geographic distance (H2)

0.003(-9.43)***

-.004(-8.08)***

Common Official Language (H3)

.19(3.53)***

.21(3.65)**

Colonial Relations (H4)

.18(2.73)***

.18(3.04)**

.22(1.11)

.24(1.17)

Distance in Legal Systems (H6)

-.07(-4.43)***

-.06(-3.11)**

Distance in Religion (H7)

-.06(-3.42)***

-.05(-2.85)**

Same Country (H5)

Distance in Proper. Rights (H8)

.2(2.82)***

.15(2.33)*

Distance in Contracting Inst. (H9)

-.05(-2.47)*

.03(1.45)

Distance in Shareh. Rights (H10)
Distance in Labor Protection (H11)
CMRA (H12)
_cons
Observations
Adj. R-Squared

.01(.69)

.04(2.29)*

-.09(-4.44)***

-.01(-.35)

.37(4.35)***

.06(.8)
-1.54(-2.95)**
1705
0.5072

-1.38(-2.07)*

-1.25(-2.42)*

-1.24(-1.8)†

1705
0.3081

1705
0.5017

1705
0.3550

Robust t statistics in parentheses; † significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant
at 1%, *** significant at 0.1%
Table 9 shows the tests results for the relative importance of time invariant (TI)
versus time variant (TV) factors in explaining the variance in HHCRij or the tests for
H13. We follow a standard variance decomposition technique, which is sensitive to the
order of entry into the model. In the base model (M1) we include all control variables,
that is the fixed country effects and economic control factors (EF). This model explains
around 31% of the variance of HHCRij. Model 2 adds TI, which explain an additional
19.4% of the variance. Model 3 adds TV to the base model and explains an additional
4.7% of the variance. Model 4 adds both TI and CI the base model. When we compare
65

M4 to M2, TV explain an additional 0.55% of the variance. When we compare M4 to
M3, TI explain an additional 15.2% of the variance. This shows that the maximum and
minimum estimates for TI (and TV respectively) are [19.4%, 19.9%] ([0.55%, 4.7%]).
The final Wald-tests for adding TV to M2 is also only marginally explanatory power (pvalue=0.054). These results support H13 and Proposition 2.

Table 9: HHCRij Variance Decomposition: Time Invariant vs. Time Varying
Factors
Model

R-Square

Adj. RSquare
0.3081
0.5017
0.3550
0.5072
0.5072
0.5072

Compared
against

Added Adj.
R-Square (%)

Wald-Test
(Prob> F)

1. CE + EF (M1)
0.3102
2. CE + EF + TI (M2)
0.5055
M1
19.36
<0.001
3. CE + EF + CI (M3)
0.3588
M1
4.69
<0.001
4. CE + EF + TI + CI (M4)
0.5124
M1
19.91
<0.001
5. CE + EF + CI + TI (M4)
0.5124
M3
15.22
<0.001
6. CE + EF + TI + CI (M4)
0.5124
M2
0.55
0.0535
Abbreviations:
CE: Home and Host Country Effects, EF: Economic Factors, TI: Time Invariant Factors, CI: Current
Institutions

Robustness Checks, Post-Hoc Analysis and Limitations
To check the robustness of our results we conducted several additional tests. We
estimated additional models using different measures of current institutions. We first
used Kogut and Singh (1988) to compute ‘cultural distance’ between the home and host
country, as an alternate instead of our measures of common language and religion. We
then added to the time invariant factors the Psychic Distance measure developed by
Håkanson and Ambos (2010). In both cases, the results obtained in regard to the relative
explanatory power of time invariant vs. time varying institutions remain. In both cases
the sample was drastically reduced, considering cultural distance is symmetric and
available for only 67 countries and psychic distance for 261 observations/country pairs.
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In the models with cultural distance several time invariant factors, including cultural
distance, are significant in this model albeit not in the full model. The time invariant
distance that consistently remains significant is that for Legal Systems Origin. In the
models with psychic distance, Psychic Distance remains significant across all models, but
in its presence the colonial relations, common language, and distance in religion become
insignificant. This suggests that using psychic distance would allow for more
parsimonious models, albeit it is limited to a smaller set of countries.
In addition, to exclude the possibility of time invariant factors’ effects being
driven by geographic distance alone, we ran separate Wald-tests for the historical and
geographic factors. Both tests were highly significant. Historical factors explain 3.6% of
the variance in HHCRij beyond that explained by the base model and geographic factors,
while geographic factors explain an additional 10% beyond the base model and historical
factors.
We conducted additional tests to try and disentangle, albeit limitedly so, the
effects of geographic closeness saliency and lowered transportation costs associated with
smaller geographic distance. To do so, we capitalize on the observation that saliency
should be evident for proximate countries only while transportation costs should apply to
all countries. As a result, the overall effects of distance should be more pronounced for
closer countries. An added squared distance term in the model had a positive and
significant coefficient at 5% supporting our conjecture. Further splitting the data into
close vs. distant pairs and running separate regressions lead to significantly different
coefficients of distance in both samples with the coefficient for close countries several
times larger than that for distant countries. The results were robust to different
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specifications of ‘closeness’ (we first defined close countries as those who were
contiguous, then we considered as ‘close’ also countries less than 1,000 km distant).
These tests hint to the existence of a saliency effect in addition to cost effects.
Finally, we reran our models using another asymmetric measure of country
relatedness based on home-host country exports rather than count of investments by firms
between countries as the dependent measure. The results were mostly unchanged, albeit
the portion of variance explained by country effects is lower (about 18%). Absolute
comparisons between the models are difficult, since the samples size obtained is much
smaller. Economic factors add around 2.5% to country effects. In contrast to Country
Relatedness, there is more variance explained both by time invariant factors (24%) and
current factors (8%).

Discussion and Conclusion
The results obtained in this study support our general theory, which proposes that
decisions are chosen close to a convenient anchor. We also find support for the idea that
older knowledge representations are likely used in strategic decision-making. Our
findings support the idea that strategic moves are influenced by managerial mental
models and managerial values which become more rigid over time and hard to change
and may exert stronger influence on decision than current environmental forces (Kiesler
& Sproull, 1982). While past research has also suggested that managerial mental models
can become rigid over time (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992), this is the first study to
demonstrate the relative importance of history and geography over current institutional
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factors in high level strategic decision making in the international business arena. The
finding is of great importance to academics and managers alike. On the managerial side,
we come to question once again the rationality of decision-making and the need to
address in some fashion the bounded rationality of managers and the use of heuristics
(Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006), which are likely to translate into suboptimal
strategic decisions. However, we are not arguing that managers necessarily make the
wrong decisions. As Tversky and Kahneman (1974: 1124) argued, these heuristics are
quite useful, albeit they sometimes lead to severe and systematic errors. Indeed as
Bouquet et al. (2009) find, beyond a certain threshold, international attention, that is, the
time and effort dedicated to scanning the global marketplace, may come at the expense of
other strategic imperatives and harm firm performance. Bingham, Eisenhardt, & Furr
(2007) find also evidence of the positive effects of heuristics in decision-making
processes and performance.
In the context of international investments, we demonstrate more specifically
home country is a key anchor in international investment decisions and that historical and
time invariant information is more likely to be used in these decisions. Firms are more
likely to choose host countries that are similar/close to their home country rather than
distant countries. Specifically, we find that geographic distance has a negative influence
on international investments in line with previous research (e.g., Egger & Pfaffermayr,
2004). In addition, contiguity of two countries positively influences international
investments. Moreover, we found evidence that the effects of distance likely go beyond
just the increase in transportation costs (also see Frankel et al., 1997: 71). This result
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shows that geographic distance sill matters even with dramatically reduced transportation
and communication (Buch, Kleinert, & Toubal, 2003).
Common language and past colonial relationships are also found to drive
international investments.

In line with our findings, past research has shown the

disproportionate investments by Spanish multinationals in Latin America (Toral, 2001)
and by Portuguese multinationals in Brazil and Portuguese-speaking Africa (Nunes,
Bastien, & Valerio, 2008). Distance in religion is found to negatively affects international
investments in line with empirical evidence suggesting that religion affects the level of
FDI (Dolansky & Alon, 2008) and corporate disclosure (Archambault & Archambault,
2003), and that religion is an important factor in predicting variation in creditor right
(Stulz & Williamson, 2002).
Finally, dissimilarity in legal systems origins is associated with reduced foreign
investments in line with past research showing that countries with the same legal system
are more likely to be the recipients of foreign direct investment (FDI) (Globerman &
Shapiro, 2003) and investments by US firms (Flores & Aguilera, 2007). The finding
highlights legal origin differences as a handicap for international business (Djankov et al.,
2003; La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta et al., 1999).
When historical and time invariant factors are excluded, time-variant institutional
distance is found to lead to decreased international investments in line with past research
stressing their importance (e.g., Delios & Henisz, 2000). Firms are less likely to make
international investments in countries with greater distance in property rights institutions.
Firms are also less likely to make international investments in countries with greater
distance in contracting institutions. This result is in line with past research showing that
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contracting institutions influence the choice of entry mode (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986)
and that their improvement reduces the governance costs of market leading to more
exports and less wholly owned subsidiaries (Henisz & Williamson, 1999).
Firms are also found to be less likely to make international investments in
countries with greater distance in shareholder and labor protection. These results are line
with past research showing that the degree of investor protection (La Porta et al., 1998,
La Porta et al., 1999) and labor rights (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Botero et al., 2004;
Capron & Guillén, 2009) in a country influence the patterns of ownership, governance
and financing (Guillén & Suárez, 2005). Finally, firms are more likely to choose as
foreign investment locations countries with which they share membership in a regional
agreement. Indeed, the foundation of European Union (EU), North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), and other major regional agreements, resulted in a significant
increase in bilateral trade volumes among the member countries (Baier & Bergstrand,
2007; Glick & Rose, 2002). However, results on bilateral FDI have not been conclusive,
considering the reduction of tariffs and other trade costs is expected to encourage vertical
investments, in which firms split up the stages of production and engage in trade, but not
necessarily horizontal investments (Baltagi et al., 2008). Empirical results reflect this
issue with some finding positive effects between regional agreements and bilateral FDI
(Brenton, 1996; Brenton, Di Mauro, & Lücke, 1999; Levy Yeyati et al., 2002, 2002a) and
others finding no such effects (Blomström & Kokko, 1997).
It is very important to note, however, that in comparison to historical and time
invariant factors current institutions have limited explanatory power, albeit some are
significant. We demonstrated that international investments between countries are driven
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primarily by time invariant factors of historic and geographic nature and time-variant
institutions, in addition to the economic and country-specific factors. Much of normative
research emphasizes the importance of examining current external conditions when
making important strategic decisions such as internationalization moves. Similarly, much
of IB research emphasizes the importance of time varying national institutions in making
internationalization and trade decisions. This research finds quite a distance between
these normative prescriptions and actual managerial practice. Our work shows that the
present is important but the past matters more for internationalization decisions. The
explanatory strength of geographic and historical factors provides additional evidence in
favor for arguments by Ghemawat (2001, 2003) on “semi-globalization” and Rugman on
“regionalization” (Fratianni & Oh, 2009; Rugman & Verbeke, 2004; Rugman, 2005). It
also provides more evidence about the importance of history to current developments (see
also Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Jones, 2006, 2006a). The results
obtained are hence consistent with macro level research within international economics
and gravity-models examining drivers of foreign direct investment and trade (Blonigen,
2005), the Uppsala model of internationalization processes (Johansson & Vahlne, 1977,
1990) with its emphasis on ‘psychic distance’ (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) and ‘cultural
distance’ (Kogut & Singh, 1988) between the home and host country, and recent
suggestions that ‘distance’ along these cultural, administrative, and economic dimensions
can affect the attractiveness of foreign markets (Ghemawat, 2001, 2003, 2007).
It is important to note that our finding does not mean that these time-variant
institutional factors are unimportant. Two possible and at time overlapping explanations
for this finding need to be disentangled in future research.
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Firstly, time-varying

institutions are likely to have their roots in the geographic and historical institutions that
provide us with possibly better overall or more parsimonious explanations (North, 1991).
As Acemoglu et al. (2001) point out, the relationship between national institutions and
performance of the countries might not account for potential endogeneity and differences
in colonial experience could be a source of exogenous differences in institutions. This
would call for a rethinking of the drivers of decisions making in general, be it historical
of current information and is in line with research in population ecology highlighting
initial imprinting (Boeker, 1989; Marquis, 2003). This also calls for a rethinking of
which institutions matter in general or under which conditions the institutions of interest
in IB research are more relevant. Secondly, managers may be making decisions with the
‘fundamentals’ in mind.

Considering that current institutional conditions are, by

definition, in flux, firms may be focusing on perennial factors that are likely to stand the
passage of time. Further studies are needed to assess this possibility. After entry
decisions are made, based primarily on time-invariant factors, the state of current
institutions and the ability of the firm to cope with institutional idiosyncrasies (Henisz,
2003) are likely to become a very important source of performance heterogeneity among
the multinationals (Meyer, Mudambi, & Narula, 2011).
Regardless, this study calls into question our primary focus within IB research on
time-varying factors while historic-geographic factors are nowadays considered to be
much less relevant. Managers are subject to bounded rationality in addition to being
constrained by the idiosyncratic resources of the firm and its worldwide strategy
(Tallman & Shenkar, 1994), and we need to understand further the impact of these biases
on strategic decisions. Other future research that may be needed is the examination of
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embeddedness at all levels on decision-making n general and international investments in
specific. We recognize that in addition to being embedded in their home country,
managers are embedded also in the context of their own firm and in their own individual
characteristics.

How do these three level of embeddedness jointly influence firms’

international decisions is unclear. More generally, it is important that future research
further includes managerial cognition into the study of strategic decisions.
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IV. THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL COHERENCE ON MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISE PERFORMANCE

Introduction
Starting with the work of Chandler (1962) and Andrews (1971), strategy research
has highlighted the importance of fit between the firms’ resources and its external
environment. In this vein, research on multinationality has examined the impact of
internal resources configurations, such as scope, degree, and institutional diversity, on
performance (e.g., Contractor et al., 2003; Goerzen & Beamish, 2003; Hitt et al., 1997;
Tallman & Li, 1996; Thomas & Eden, 2004). Other research has also examined the
impact of the external environment, including the institutional environment on
multinational firm performance (e.g., Chacar, Newburry, & Vissa, 2010). However, the
fit between the resources and the external environment is rarely explored in the
international arena (for an exception see De la Torre, Esperança, & Martinez, 2010). We
propose in this study to tackle this issue of fit.
More specifically, we propose that firms, over time, develop the resource and
capabilities that are best suited to deal with their current external environment.
Considering the importance of capitalizing on firms’ unique rare and valuable resources
(Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 1979), firms are likely to have a superior performance if they are
able to reuse and capitalize on their fungible or expandable resources and capabilities in a
new environment (Penrose, 1959).

Such an exploitation strategy is more likely to

succeed when the current resources and capabilities are also valuable in the new
environment, hence, when the new environment is somewhat similar or close to the
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firms’ current external environment. Focusing on the national environment, we propose
that firms that operate in sets of countries that are ‘related’ are likely to have a superior
performance to those that do not. We coin the term international coherence, defined as
the degree to which a Multinational Enterprise’s (MNE) network comprises countries that
are related, to describe these firms. A high level of international coherence allows for the
transfer of firms’ country-specific resources and capabilities from one specific country to
others within the MNEs network, which is a key potential source of competitive
advantage for MNEs (Goerzen & Beamish, 2003).
We test the theory proposed using a sample of over 1,000 U.S. multinational
enterprises (MNEs), and find support for the theory presented. It should be also noted that
these results hold, even after controlling for the numerous dimensions of multinationality
identified in past literature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We review first the relevant
literature on the relationship between multinationality and firm performance, describing
the evolution of the concept of multinationality. We also shortly review the past research
on and the role of external institutional environment for MNEs’ performance. Then we
introduce the concept of international coherence and develop the study’s hypothesis. The
next section describes the methodology, measures and sample followed by a description
of the empirical results and our conclusions. It is important to note that our approach
likely addresses a key concern that has been raised on research on the relationship
between multinationality and performance, namely the need to account for relatedness
among countries within an MNE’s network (Goerzen & Beamish, 2003; Vachani, 1991;
Verbeke & Brugman, 2009; Verbeke, Li, & Goerzen, 2009).
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Literature Review
External Environment Fit and MNE Performance
The concept of “fit” originating in population ecology and contingency theory
(Van de Ven, 1979; Venkatraman, 1989) is considered fundamental to strategic
management (Schendel & Hofer, 1979; Venkatraman & Camillus, 1984), where it is
conceptualized as the alignment of organizational competencies and resources with the
opportunities and threats in the external environmental (Andrews, 1971; Chandler, 1962;
Rumelt, 1974). In a purely domestic context, the research on fit has in general provided
evidence that the match of internal resources with the requirements of the external
environment is beneficial for the organization (e.g., Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990;
Zajac, Kraatz, & Bresser, 2000).
In the field of international business, the need for fit prominently appears in the
Integration-Responsiveness (I/R) framework proposed by Prahalad (1975) and Doz
(1976). According to this framework and through their multi-country activity, MNEs
should be able to exploit market imperfections and capitalize on their worldwide
competitive advantage (Roth & Morrison, 1990), while being responsive to the
institutional environment in each location (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Kostova, 1999;
Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Prahalad & Doz, 1987).
While the I/R framework emphasizes the importance of considering the fit of an
MNE’s strategy with the institutional context within each of the host countries, it doesn’t
address how companies adapt to a variety of varying local contexts simultaneously
(Meyer, Mudambi, & Narula, 2011). Moreover, much of the current research on
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multinationality ignores the issue of fit and rather focuses on the configuration of an
MNEs’ international resources across the geographic space and its relationship with
performance with more recent work focusing on the relationship between the external
environment and performance, as reviewed below.

MNE Internal Resources and Configuration and Performance
While firm resources and capabilities are essential to success in both a domestic
and an international context, IB research has highlighted the impact of two related sets of
resources that apply only in the context of an MNE. The first set is centers around the
‘ownership’ advantage. The second set is multinationality as a resources and internal
configuration across the geographic space.

As discussed below, both of these are

generally explored without regard to fit with the external environment.
The transfer of MNE’s resources in the form of firm-specific advantages (Hymer,
1976) or “ownership advantages” (Dunning, 1977) has been at the root of most prominent
FDI-theories. In fact, the ability to transfer, recombine, and exploit these resources across
multiple contexts is considered the rationale for the existence of the MNE (Meyer et al.,
2011). The resources considered in descriptions of the ownership advantage are mostly
different types of knowledge underlying technology, production, marketing, or other
activities (e.g. Kogut & Zander, 1993). Several studies highlight the role that such
intangible resources together with MNE’s experience play in improving MNE’s
performance (Delios & Beamish, 1999; Fang, Wade, Delios, & Beamish, 2007; Gao, Pan,
Lu, & Tao, 2008; Tallman & Chacar, 2011).
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As the ownership advantage emerged into the limelight, multinationality, as a
resource also became the focus of study. Researchers initially contrasted multinational
companies to purely domestic firms (Hymer, 1975; Stopford & Wells, 1972; Vernon,
1971). In this research, multinationality itself is viewed as a resource (and at times a
liability). The conceptual logic underlying the investigation of the multinationalityperformance relationship mostly rests on the comparison of the incremental benefits and
costs of internationalization (Ruigrok, Amman, & Wagner, 2007). On the benefits side,
multinationality is expected to help exploit scale economies, engage in price
discrimination and arbitrage knowledge acquisition, and have better and more flexible
resources (Contractor et al., 2003; Hitt et al., 1997; Kim, Hwang, & Burgers, 1993). In
addition, MNEs can exploit differences in government regulations and increase their
bargaining power due to increased size (Thomas & Eden, 2004). Tallman and Li (1986)
also emphasized the importance of the ability to manage extensive networks of
international subsidiaries at low transactional costs, because multinationality creates
opportunities to leverage strategic resources while simultaneously diversifying market
risks, thus raising its performance (Kim et al., 1993).
On the cost side, with increased presence in foreign countries, MNEs are more
exposed to foreign exchange risks, to legitimacy issues due to multiple levels of
authority, and greater cultural diversity, which is expected to increase the costs of
operations (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Thomas & Eden, 2004; Zaheer, 1995).
After some earlier attempts to account for the dispersion of multinational
activities across dissimilar geographic regions (Buhner, 1987; Grant, 1987; Kim, Hwang,
& Burgers, 1989), research moved beyond a comparison of domestic firms to MNEs,
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researchers emphasized the multidimensional nature of the multinationality construct
(Tallman & Li, 1996; Thomas & Eden, 2004; Sullivan, 1994) with researchers exploring
the impact of international scope, degree, and institutional diversity, on MNE
performance and a number of parallels drawn to product diversification theories (e.g.,
Contractor et al., 2003; Goerzen & Beamish, 2003; Hitt et al., 1997; Makino, Isobe, &
Chan, 2004; Tallman & Li, 1996; Thomas & Eden, 2004; Tong, Alessandri, Reuer, &
Chintakananda, 2008). A distinction was established between degree and scope of
international diversification, defined as the geographic range or breadth of the firm’s
foreign presence (Goerzen & Beamish, 2003; Tallman and Li, 1996; Wiersema &
Bowen, 2008). The potential for arbitrage was also presented as a means to superior
performance with the MNEs presumed to leverage location-specific advantages across
their countries of operations (Kogut, 1985; Tallman & Li, 1996). Others presented a
power argument highlighting the potential for multipoint competition (Karnani &
Wernerfelt, 1985). Following Vachani (1991), further distinction was made between
related and unrelated international geographic diversification (e.g., Gomez-Mejia &
Palich 1997; Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt, 2000) with authors using different country
categorizations (e.g., Hofstede, 1980; Ronen and Shenkar, 1985) to account for the
diversity of investment locations of MNEs.

External MNE Environment and Performance
As in the broader management research, the IB field has highlighted the role of
the external environment to firm performance with one major difference in emphasis.
While the influence of the ‘‘environment’’ has long been investigated (e.g., Lawrence &
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Lorsch, 1969), the emphasis has been on the task environment with the institutional
environment mostly in the ‘‘background’’ (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). IB research has
demonstrated that institutional frameworks differ substantially across countries (e.g.,
Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Prahalad and Doz,
1987) and that this heterogeneity leads to context-specific industry structures and
performance (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Ricart et al., 2004).
Again, this research has been essential of our understandings of the impact of the MNE
environment on its performance but has not explored the concept of fit.
Compared to some factors of production that are increasingly mobile, formal and
informal institutions “represent the major immobile factors in a globalized market”
(Mudambi & Navarra, 2002: 636) and the costs and benefits of adapting MNE’s
organization and governance to these conditions are important in determining the
attractiveness of a location (Meyer et al., 2011). As Ingram and Silverman (2002: 20) put
it: ‘‘institutions directly determine what arrows a firm has in its quiver as it struggles to
formulate and implement strategy and to create competitive advantage.’’
Scott and Meyer (1983: 140, 149) defined task or technical environments as
"those within which a product or service is exchanged in a market such that organizations
are rewarded for effective and efficient control of the work process," in contrast to
institutional environments that "are characterized by the elaboration of rules and
requirements to which individual organizations must conform if they are to receive
support and legitimacy from the environment.” In a frequently used definition,
institutions are the ‘‘rules of the game’’, or more formally ‘‘the humanly devised
constraints that structure human interaction’’ (North, 1990: 3).
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Research on emerging economies, which differ substantially from developed
economies in terms of institutions, has provided very valuable insights and empirical
evidence demonstrating the importance of institutional factors in addition to industry- and
resource-based factors (e.g., Chacar, Newburry, & Vissa, 2010; Chacar & Vissa, 2005;
Doh, Teegen, & Mudambi, 2004; McMillan, 2007). For example, Makino et al. (2004)
found that country effects were as strong as industry effects, following affiliate and
corporate effects, and that country effects were more salient in developing countries.
Chacar and Vissa (2005) investigated manufacturing firms in the United States and India
and demonstrated that poor firm performance persists longer in emerging economies than
in developed ones. Chacar et al. (2010) in their recent longitudinal study of over 10,000
firms from 33 countries, provided further evidence of the importance of formal
institutions in the product, financial, and labor markets on firm performance persistence.
Finally, Kim, Kim, and Hoskisson (2010) found that the stage of market-oriented
institutional changes affects the relationship between international diversification and
firm performance.
All these studies and many others more point to the importance of the external
environment for MNE-activity and that the heterogeneity in host countries’ institutional
environments may influence the applicability of resource-based advantages (Brouthers,
Brouthers, & Werner, 2008).
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Theory Development
The Role of International Coherence
Previous research on the effects of multinationality on performance has focused
almost exclusively on the extent of foreign investment or its dispersion among the
countries without explicitly considering the MNEs’ resources or the diversity of the
MNEs’ environment. By doing so, researchers have implicitly assumed that firm
resources would be equally adapted to any foreign country, alternatively, the assumption
is that national institutional environments outside of the home country are homogeneous.
One exception is the study of Goerzen & Beamish (2003), in which the authors
specifically point to the importance of considering country environment diversity and
find evidence that this type of diversity is negatively associated with performance.
We coined in this study the term international coherence, defined as the degree to
which a Multinational Enterprise’s (MNE) network comprises countries that are related,
to describe these firms. This term is inspired by Teece et al. (1994) concept of corporate
coherence, describing firms that operate in relatively close technological and product
market spaces, a concept that is distinct from product diversification. In a similar vein,
International Coherence is distinct of geographic or international diversification. MNEs
might have a high level of international diversity but operate in countries that are
relatively similar. Conversely, even at low levels of diversification operating in dissimilar
environments increases environmental and internal governance complexity at the
corporate level (Hutzschenreuter, Voll, & Verbeke, 2011; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999) and
makes it more difficult to respond appropriately to local demands (Goerzen & Beamish,
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2003). The knowledge that is created in distant countries will only marginally overlap
with the existing knowledge making it more difficult for companies to learn from their
local experience (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).
We argue in this study that through selection and learning (Levinthal & March,
1993) firms select resources and develop capabilities that are fit with their current
environment. This prediction is in line with Pennings, Barkema, and Douma (1994: 610)
who argued that expansions are more likely to succeed if they are similar and related to
what a firm has done before. These resources and capabilities are an essential element to
the success of firms, superior performance and a sustained competitive advantage
(Barney, 1986, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). Changing these resources and capability is
difficult (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) and incremental at best. As such firms that can
capitalize on their current resources and capabilities may perform better than other firms
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).
Firms may also be able to enhance their performance by reutilizing their resources
in new arenas, be it new product markets or new geographic markets (Penrose, 1959) and
an MNE’s international expansion into new local contexts is one specific type of
Penrosean growth (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011; Pitelis & Verbeke, 2007). This resourcebased view of a firm would suggest that a good approach to internationalization should
entail expansion into countries which environment is somewhat similar to that of a firm’s
current external environment. By definition, firms that operate in related countries have
high levels of international coherence. Hence, firms with high international coherence
should be able to reuse and capitalize on their existing resources and competencies better
than those who don’t and achieve scope economies in resources usage. As a firm moves
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to ‘neighboring’ country, it may also adapt its resources and improve of the experiential
knowledge collected through previous expansions. Relatedness of countries of expansion
allows MNEs not only to improve and refine their existing knowledge and routines
(Barkema & Drogendijk, 2007) but also to apply existing concepts and linkages between
them (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Following such adaptation, MNEs resources will
become more readily transferable to the third countries or the neighboring countries to its
neighbor countries and hence also likely to be more profitable. In fact, experience in the
host country, or similar countries, is shown to positively affect the performance and the
survival rate of foreign subsidiaries (Barkema & Drogendijk, 2007; Luo & Peng, 1999;
Shaver, Mitchell, & Yeung, 1997). Our theory is mostly consistent with a strategy of
exploitation (March, 1991) which is likely to present lower risk levels and superior
shorter-term performance. Exploration is made possible also with resource adaptation
allowing subsequent expansions and hence ensuring potentially long term performance.
We hence propose that international coherence will lead to superior performance,
or more formally:
Hypothesis 1: All else being equal, International Coherence of an MNE is
positively related to its performance.

Methods

Empirical Setting and Analytical Approach
The primary source of data used in this study was OSIRIS, a product of Bureau
van Dijk. OSIRIS collects data on all publicly traded companies worldwide. The data
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includes financial as well as ownership information on all domestic and foreign
investments. In particular this study focused on industrial U.S. MNEs that have
investments abroad. After removing subsidiaries without host country information, we
had an initial sample of 1,989 U.S. MNEs. In addition, for the companies in the sample,
the data was complemented by financial information available through Compustat North
America as well as segments data from Compustat Segments. As a result of missing data,
we ended up with 1,001 firms that have been used in all empirical tests.

Variable description and measurement
Firm Performance. We measured firm performance using the Return on Assets
(ROA) defined as Income Before Extraordinary Items divided by the sum of Total Assets
and Depreciation, Depletion, and Amortization. ROA is often used in studies that
investigate the relationship between different dimensions of multinationality and
performance (e.g., Contractor et al., 2003; Geringer et al., 1989; Gomes & Ramaswamy,
1999; Gomez-Meija & Palich, 1997; Hitt et al., 1997). As Hitt et al. (1997) argue, ROA
together with Return on Sales (ROS) are more appropriate than Return on Equity (ROE),
because they are less sensitive to differing capital structures. Between ROA and ROS,
again in line with Hitt et al., (1997) we choose ROA, because some of our control
variables are dependent on sales.
International Coherence. The construction of our International Coherence
measure (IC) went through several steps. In the first step we attach a value of relatedness
to each pair of countries in which an MNE operates. Within the MNE’s network we
distinguish between the MNE’s home country and host countries. The way in which we
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capture the Home-Host Country Relatedness was demonstrated earlier (see Equations 1
and 2 in Chapter I). In order to calculate the relatedness between two host countries we
use another measure that is symmetrical, albeit both follow the survivor principle (Stigler,
1968; Teece et al., 1994).
In line with Teece et al. (1994) we find first the number of MNEs that have
operations in both host country i and k. We compare this number with the number that
would result if international diversification would be random, that is countries would be
chosen randomly. If there are N MNEs worldwide, out of which ci have investments in
country i and ck in country k, the number xik of firms that would, under the random
choice hypothesis, invest in both countries follows a hypergeometric distribution. That is,

, , ,

Equation 8: Hypergeometric distribution

The mean for this distribution is:

and the variance:

1
Equation 9: Mean and standard deviation of hypergeometric distribution
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If the observed number Mik of firms that invest in both countries i and k
substantially exceeds μik, then we say that the two countries are strongly related. More
precisely, the measure of relatedness is:

Equation 10: Formula for SCRik

As in the case of HHCRij, the symmetric measure is appropriately transformed to
range from -1 to +1.
In the second step we use this measure to build a Relatedness Matrix for each
MNE. As an illustration, in Table 10 we present the Relatedness Matrix for TJX
COMPANIES INC., an MNE that has operations in seven countries, including the U.S.,
its home country.

Table 10: Relatedness matrix for TJX COMPANIES INC.
CA

DE

GB

HK

IE

PR

US

0.55

0.59
0.57

0.41
0.27
0.17

0.62
0.56
0.54
0.45

0.35
0.27
0.2
0.32
0.42

0.57
0.04
0.28
-0.41
0.28
0.72

CA
DE
GB
HK
IE
PR

0.55
0.59
0.41
0.62
0.35

0.57
0.27
0.56
0.27

0.17
0.54
0.2

0.45
0.32

0.42

US

0.57

0.04

0.28

-0.41

0.28
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0.72

Figure 1: Countries’ Network for TJX COMPANIES INC
CA

.57

.55

US

DE

GB

PR

.17
IE

HK

Abbreviations: CA - Canada, DE - Germany, GB - United Kingdom, HK - Hong
Kong, IE - Ireland, PR - Puerto Rico, US - United States of America
For an MNE that has investments in n countries there are n(n-1)/2 pairs of
relatedness measures among countries. In the case of TJX COMPANIES INC., there are
21 links (see Figure 1; the relatedness measures are shown only for a couple of links in
that Figure). However, a subset of only n - 1 links among countries can create a
connected graph that includes them all. If this subset has the property that the sum of the
relatedness measures on each link is largest, it is called the maximum spanning tree
(MST). The MST for TJX COMPANIES INC. has 6 links (shown in Figure 2).

89

Figure 2: Maximum Spanning Tree for TJX COMPANIES INC.
CA
(3)

.57
US
(61)

DE
(3)

.59

.57

.72
.62

GB
(4)

PR
(1)

IE
(1)

.45

HK
(1)

Abbreviations: CA - Canada, DE - Germany, GB - United Kingdom, HK - Hong Kong,
IE - Ireland, PR - Puerto Rico, US - United States of America

The last step is to use the MST to calculate an overall measure of IC. First, we
weigh each of the countries in terms of importance they have for the MNE. While MNE’s
sales by country, or the actual size of investments in each of the countries would be
preferable as weights, they are not systematically available (Delios, Xu, & Beamish,
2008). Instead, we consider the count of an MNE’s investments weighted by the
percentage ownership in each country as a measure of size and the percentage to the total
number of MNE’s investments as weight (e.g., Delios et al., 2008; Sullivan, 1994). In
Figure 2, we have included the number of subsidiaries next to each country code. For
instance, TJX COMPANIES INC. has 3 subsidiaries in Germany, only one in Puerto
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Rico, and 61 in the U.S. For each of the countries in the network, we calculate the
average relatedness across the links that are part of the MST. Finally, denoting wi the
weight and ri the relatedness of country ci, the IC for a given MNE would be:

∗

Equation 11: Formula for IC

Control Variables. We controlled for several firm and industry characteristics that
might also affect performance.
To control for firm effects, we included in our models Firm Size which we
measured by firm sales (SALES). A firm’s size can potentially increase its market power
and its ability to dominate its industry and generate larger profits (Chang & Thomas,
1989). We also corrected for firm age (AGE), which we measured to the year 2007. Age
has been hypothesized to affect firm’s performance (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Sørensen &
Stuart, 2000). We also corrected for innovation using R&D-intensity, measured as the
ratio of R&D-expenditure ratio to total sales (RDINT), as a resource factor that can
increase the firm’s product differentiation vis-à-vis its competitors and hence a firm’s
profitability. In cases where firms didn’t report R&D-expenditures or reported
insignificant amounts we considered the values to be zero, but added also a dummy
variable (RDDUM), which takes a value of 1 when there are no R&D-expenditures and 0
otherwise. In order to control for the overall importance of foreign operations, we
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included also the degree of internationalization, which we measured using the ratio of
foreign sales to total sales (FSTS). This measure has been widely used in the research on
the effects of multinationality on performance (e.g., Gomes & Ramaswamy, 1999; Grant,
Jammine, & Thomas, 1988; Tallman & Li, 1996; Thomas & Eden, 2004; Wiersema and
Bowen, 2008). Finally, we controlled for firm’s previous performance, using ROA for
year 2007 (ROA-1), a method that helps control for fixed firm effects in cross-sectional
data.
The extent of industry competition is also likely to affect firms’ performance
(e.g., Andrews, 1971; Bain, 1951; Porter, 1980). To account for this important factor, we
controlled for industry concentration using the Herfindahl-index (HERF) (Herfindahl,
1950; Hirschman, 1945), computed as the sum of the squared firm’s sales as a fraction of
total industry sales (4-digit SIC code). In addition we controlled for industry profitability
(INDPROF) defined as Income Before Extraordinary Items divided by Sales (net),
calculated at 4-digit level of SIC-code. For both measures we used the full Compustat
data set for the year 2007.

Model
We use OLS regression to examine the relationship between international
coherence and firm performance using the following model:

ROA = β0 + β1*INDPROF + β2*HERF + β3*AGE + β4*SALES + β5*RDINT +
β6*RDDUM + β7*ROA-1 + β8*FSTS + ε
Equation 12: Statistical model 1 for ROA
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All the control and independent measures are measured for the year 2007 while
ROA is measured in the year 2008.

Results
Table 11 shows descriptive statistics as well as the correlations for the variables
used in our model. ROA is positively and significantly correlated with IC as well as with
AGE and the two industry variables: INDPROF and HERF, albeit the correlations are
low. Not surprisingly, the correlation between ROA and ROA-1 is significant and
relatively high (0.57). However, the correlation between ROA and RDINT is negative
and significant (-0.4).

Table 11: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix
Mean

Std.
Dev.

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

ROA
INDPROF
HERF
AGE
SALES
RDINT
ROA-1
FSTS

0.31
6.3
0.28
42.74
6.33
0.92
4.01
0.34

17.4
6.6
0.23
37.01
18.78
24.15
10.2
0.27

1
0.08*
0.07*
0.12*
0.06
-0.4*
0.57*
0.02

1
-0.06
-0.06*
0.004
0.04
0.1*
0.12*

1
0.09*
0.006
-0.03
0.1*
-0.08*

1
0.12*
-0.03
0.09*
0.05

1
-0.01
0.06
0.01

1
-0.44*
-0.04

1
0.03

1

(9)

IC

0.57

0.17

0.11*

0.05

0.01

0.1*

0.09*

-0.04

0.11*

0.29*

* significant at 0.05

Table 12 shows the results of OLS regressions predicting ROA. For all the models
we used a balanced dataset of 1,001 observations for which data on all variables were
available. M1 is the base model not including ROA-1 and FSTS. M2 adds FSTS to M1,
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while M3 and M4 add our main independent variable IC to M1 and M2, respectively.
Models M5 to M8 are built in a similar way, but they all include in addition also ROA-1
as a control.
Robustness Checks. To test for the robustness of our results, we conducted
several additional tests. We tested models M1 to M4 replacing FSTS, first with the
number of countries where an MNE operates as a proxy for the scope of diversification,
and then with an entropy measure of product diversification, which we calculated using
business segment data (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Moesel, 1993; Jacquemin & Berry,
1979). In both cases IC remained significant. The results didn’t change even when we
used the related or unrelated components of product diversification (following Hoskisson
et al. (1993: 222), we defined related diversification as “the diversification arising from
operating in four-digit segments within a two-digit industry group” and unrelated
diversification as “the diversification arising from operating between two-digit industry
groups”, with total firm sales as the sales reference in both cases).
In addition to our main measure of IC, we use an alternative one, in which we
used the simple (not weighted) count of subsidiaries in a country as measure of size.
While the first measure provides a more accurate picture, data on ownership is not always
available and the reporting not always standardized. The two measures were highly
correlated (above 0.98) and the results changed very little (although, there was a slight
drop in significance for models M7 and M8).
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Table 12: Explaining MNE performance with International Coherence

INDPROF
HERF
AGE
SALES
RDINT
RDDUM
ROA-1
FSTS
IC
_cons

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

M6

M7

M8

0.3(3.1)***
4.5(2.6)***
0.1(5.1)***
0.04(3)***
-0.3(-7.6)***
0.6(0.7)

0.3(3)***
4.4(2.5)*
0.05(5.2)***
0.04(3)***
-0.3(-7.5)***
0.58(0.58)

0.3(2.9)***
4.5(2.6)**
0.05(5)***
0.04(2.8)***
-0.3(-7.6)***
1.03(1.03)

0.3(2.9)***
4.3(2.4)*
0.05(5)***
0.04(2.8)***
-0.3(-7.6)***
0.8(0.8)

0.1(1.2)
1.4(1)
0.04(4.1)***
0.02(2.1)*
-0.1(-3.7)***
0.08(0.09)
0.8(4.7)***

0.1(1.2)
1.3(0.9)
0.04(4.1)***
0.02(2.1)*
-0.1(-3.6)***
0.02(-0.02)
0.8(4.7)***
-0.7(-0.3)

0.1(1.2)
1.4(1)
0.03(3.9)***
0.02(1.9)†
-0.1(-3.7)***
0.3(0.3)
0.8(4.7)***

-5.5(-4.8)***

-5.3(-3.7)***

4.2(1.71)†
-7.5(-3.9)***

0.1(1.2)
1.3(0.9)
0.03(4)***
0.02(1.9)†
-0.1(-3.7)***
0.1(0.1)
0.8(4.7)***
-1.5(-0.6)
4.8(1.8)†
-7.7(-3.8)***

-0.3(-0.1)
-5.1(-3.9)***

-5(-2.9)***

8(2.34)*
-9.5(-3.6)***

-1.8(-0.6)
8.7(2.51)*
-9.3(-3.4)***

F-value
Prob > F

15.57
<.001

13.38
<.001

13.51
<.001

11.88
<.001

17.99
<.001

15.82
<.001

15.8
<.001

14.15
<.001

R-squared

0.1876

0.1876

0.1938

0.1944

0.3565

0.3566

0.3582

0.3586

† significant at 0.1, * significant at 0.05, **significant at 0.01, ***significant at 0.001
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Discussion and Conclusion
Our tests demonstrate that international coherence, as a way of capturing the
MNEs’ overall fit with its multiple host country environments, is an important construct
for international business. We found evidence that maintaining a high level of
international coherence is beneficial for the MNEs. Firms that are characterized by high
levels of international coherence are able to capitalize on their existing resources and
competencies better than those who don’t and achieve scope economies in resources
usage. In addition, MNEs that operate in related countries both improve their existing
knowledge base (Barkema & Drogendijk, 2007) and apply existing concepts and linkages
between them (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Hence resources will become more readily
transferable to the third countries.
Our finding that firms characterized by high levels of IC remain close to their
knowledge base in their international expansion moves, which allows them to exploit
their existing knowledge and routines, is also in line with previous research in
organizational learning (Levinthal & March, 1993; Pennings, Barkema, & Douma, 1994).
The results obtained are similar to the study by Goerzen and Beamish (2003) that
found that country environment diversity is negatively associated with performance,
albeit we capture the combination of diversity as they name it, and fit. The results are also
in line with other studies that contend that doing business in heterogeneous countries
leads to lower performance for MNEs (e.g., Li and Guisinger, 1992; Chang, 1995) or
their subsidiaries (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Fang, Wade, Delios, & Beamish,
2007).
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While other studies have found no such effects (e.g., Brouthers, Brouthers, &
Werner, 2008), or even that dissimilarity was associated with lower rate of joint venture
dissolution (Park & Ungson, 1997), the inconsistent findings maybe, at least in part, a
result of conceptual and/or methodological issues related to the construct of country
similarities (Shenkar, 2001). In fact, what construct is used to capture similarity (e.g.,
cultural distance, psychic distance, institutional distance) and what dimensions are used,
remains largely at the discretion of the researcher. This, in turn, is translated into noncomparable approaches to conceptualization and measurement of country diversity, or
heterogeneity at firm level. Our conceptualization of international coherence provides a
more researcher-independent approach due to its reliance on the concept of country
relatedness, which is revealed by the actual patterns of international investments made by
multinational firms between any two countries. In addition, our conceptualization of
country relatedness doesn’t require that related countries be similar. Certain countries
might be often combined because of complementarities, rather than similarities. Here, we
agree with other authors that managing MNEs is not about creating homogeneity, but
about ‘managing differences’ (Ghemawat, 2007; Meyer et al., 2011).
In Chapter II we argued that managers use heuristics for their international
investment decisions and that these heuristics led the MNEs invest close to the home
country. While this describes the behavior of the average firm, specific firms might take
different paths depending on their specific bundles of resources. The empirical evidence
we found in this paper, namely that maintaining a high level of IC has a positive effect on
performance of the MNEs, shows that the heuristics used by managers can be beneficial,
in line with previous research (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974: 1124; Bingham, Eisenhardt,
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& Furr, 2007). The fact that firms that remain close to their knowledge base succeed,
together with the finding of the previous chapter that managers are cognitively driven to
search locally, provides evidence that superior performance is the result of “superior
ability to manage the cognitive processes underlying the intelligence of local action”
(Gavetti, 2009: 3; Gavetti et al., 2005).
Finally, our study brings also a methodological contribution by introducing a new
measure of international coherence that is based on the survivor measure of country
relatedness. As such it is more appropriate for the needs of international business research
and is free from researcher’s bias.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions and Sources (Chapter I)
HHCRij
HCCj

Variable

Description
Home Host Country Relatedness
Host Country Connectedness

Source
1
1

BHCRij

Bridge to Host Country Relatedness

1

Diff. in religion
Diff. in education
Diff. in industrial development
Diff. in languages
Diff. in POLCON
Diff in POLITY IV
Diff. in the FHPR
Diff. in the FHCL
Diff. in Political Ideology

Differences in religion
Differences in education
Differences in industrial development
Differences in languages
Differences in political constraints (POLCON V)
Difference in the Modified POLITY IV
Difference in the Freedom House Political Rights
Difference in the Freedom House Civil Liberties
Difference in Beck's Political Ideology
Dummy: 1 if one of the countries was colony of the other
or they had the same colonizer; 0 otherwise
Dummy: 1 if the countries have been part of the same
country; 0 otherwise
Distance in legal systems
Dummy: 1 if countries are contiguous; 0 otherwise
Geographic Distance as an weighted average considering
main cities

2
2
2
2
3
4
5
5
6

Colonial Relations
Same Country
Distance in Legal Systems
Contiguous countries
Geographic distance

1: Author’s calculations based on data from Bureau van Dijk/Osiris
2: Dow & Karunaratna (2006)
3: POLCON (Henisz, 2000)
4: Gleditsch, K. S. (2008)
5: Freedom House
6: Beck, T., Clarke, G., et al. (2001)
7: CEPII database on bilateral distances
8: Author’s calculation based on JuriGlobe project of the University of Ottawa
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7
7
8
7
7

Appendix 2: Home Host Country Relatedness for OECD Countries
AT AU BE CA CH CL CZ DE DK ES FI FR GB GR HU IE IS IT JP KR LU MX NL NO NZ PL PT SE SI SK TR
AT
-0.5 -0.5 -0.8 0.2 -0.6 0.9 0.7 -0.2 -0.5 -0.6 -0.4 -0.5 -0.7 0.9 -0.9 -1.0 0.0 -0.7 -0.2 -0.1 -0.8 -0.1 -0.6 -0.5 0.6 -0.7 -0.3 0.9 0.9 0.6
AU -0.9
-0.6 0.1 -0.4 0.0 -0.6 -0.3 -0.7 -0.6 -0.7 -0.5 0.2 -0.7 -0.5 -0.4 0.0 -0.5 -0.6 -0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.7 1.0 -0.8 -0.9 -0.5 -0.8 -0.5 -0.5
BE 0.0 -0.5
-0.5 0.1 -0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.6 -0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 -1.0 0.2 -0.6 -0.3 0.7 -0.3 0.6 -0.2 -0.8 0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1
CA -0.7 -0.1 -0.7
-0.3 -0.2 -0.9 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 -0.4 0.1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.2 -0.1 -0.7 -0.3 -0.5 -0.6 -0.2 -0.5 -0.5 -0.8 -0.9 -0.8 -0.6 -1.0 -0.9 -0.7
CH 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1
-0.3 -0.3 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.6 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4
CL -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.8 -1.0
-1.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.7 -1.0 -0.6 -0.8 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.7 -0.5 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
CZ 0.5 -1.0 0.1 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
0.2 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.4 -0.6 -1.0 0.8 -1.0 1.0 -0.1 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.6 -0.1 -1.0 0.7 -1.0 -1.0 0.9 1.0 0.4
DE 0.6 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 0.3 -0.3 0.3
-0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.3 -0.2 -0.4 0.2 -0.3 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.2
DK 0.2 -0.4 0.0 -0.5 0.0 -0.3 0.2 0.3
-0.1 0.8 0.0 -0.2 0.2 0.3 -0.5 0.8 0.0 -0.6 -0.4 -0.1 -0.3 0.1 0.8 -0.2 0.5 0.0 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.4
ES 0.3 -0.7 -0.2 -0.4 -0.3 0.9 0.2 -0.2 -0.8
-0.9 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 -1.0 0.2 -0.9 -0.9 0.2 0.7 0.1 -0.7 -0.9 -0.3 0.9 -0.8 -0.1 0.2 -0.4
FI 0.2 -0.3 0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.0
0.2 -0.3 -0.2 0.5 -0.1 0.4 -0.1 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.3 0.2 0.7 -0.6 0.2 0.0 0.9 0.5 0.3 -0.3
FR -0.1 -0.2 0.5 -0.3 0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.0
0.2 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
GB -0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.2
0.0 -0.3 0.3 -0.3 -0.1 0.3 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.7 -0.4 0.1
GR 0.1 -0.9 -1.0 -0.9 -0.6 -0.7 -0.3 -0.2 -1.0 -0.6 -1.0 -0.4 -0.1
0.0 0.0 -1.0 -0.2 -1.0 -0.7 0.4 -1.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.7 0.0 -1.0 -0.9 0.2 0.0 0.8
HU 0.6 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.5 -1.0 0.9 0.1 -1.0 -0.3 -1.0 -0.5 -0.3 0.4
-1.0 -1.0 -0.1 -0.5 -1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.4 -1.0 -1.0 0.7 -1.0 -1.0 0.7 0.9 0.4
IE -0.8 -0.5 0.1 -0.3 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 0.5 -0.8 -0.4
-1.0 -0.5 -0.8 -0.8 -0.2 -0.5 0.3 -0.6 -0.4 0.1 -0.5 -0.4 -1.0 -0.2 -0.6
IS -1.0 -0.6 -0.4 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.9 -0.1 0.7 0.1 0.5 -1.0 -1.0 0.5
-0.3 -0.6 -0.4 0.3 -1.0 0.4 0.8 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.3 -1.0 0.6 0.3
IT 0.4 -0.3 0.0 -0.4 0.4 -0.4 -0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.3 0.0 0.4 -0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.1
0.2 0.0 0.5 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 -0.5 0.5 0.2 -0.1 0.5 -0.2 0.3
JP -0.6 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 -0.5 -0.2 -0.6 -0.1 -0.1 -0.7 -0.1 -0.5 -1.0 -0.3
0.4 -0.7 -0.1 -0.2 -0.8 -0.2 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.3 -0.5 -0.4
KR -0.2 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -0.4 -0.1 0.1 0.3 -1.0 -0.5 -1.0 -0.4 -0.3 -0.5 0.0 -0.2 -1.0 -0.4 -0.3
-0.8 0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.6 0.1 -0.2 -0.4 0.5 0.7 -0.2
LU 0.0 -0.5 0.7 -0.2 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.6 -0.1 0.7 -0.4 0.1 0.4 -0.3 -1.0 0.1 -0.8 -0.5
0.0 0.3 0.1 -1.0 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1
MX -1.0 -0.2 -1.0 -0.4 -1.0 0.4 -0.2 -0.7 -1.0 0.7 -1.0 -1.0 -0.8 -1.0 0.1 -0.2 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.1
-0.2 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.4 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
NL 0.1 -0.1 0.5 -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1
-0.1 -0.3 0.4 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0
NO -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 0.2 -0.3 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 0.1 0.8 -0.3 -0.6 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 0.0
-0.5 -0.3 -0.3 0.9 -0.4 -0.1 -0.8
NZ -1.0 0.9 -0.1 0.0 -1.0 -0.1 -1.0 -0.5 0.2 -0.6 -0.2 -0.7 0.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.5 -1.0 -0.6 -0.8 -1.0 -0.4 -0.5 -0.3 -1.0
-1.0 -1.0 -0.5 -1.0 -1.0 -0.5
PL 0.5 -1.0 -1.0 -0.4 -0.4 -1.0 0.8 0.6 0.0 0.2 -1.0 -0.1 -0.1 -1.0 0.8 -1.0 -1.0 -0.4 -1.0 -1.0 0.8 -1.0 0.6 -0.1 -1.0
-1.0 0.1 -1.0 0.8 -1.0
PT -0.4 -0.9 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -1.0 0.2 -0.3 -0.6 0.9 -1.0 0.2 -0.6 0.6 0.1 0.0 -1.0 -0.1 -0.9 -1.0 0.3 -0.9 0.3 -1.0 -1.0 0.8
-0.8 -1.0 0.4 -0.2
SE 0.3 -0.5 0.1 -0.5 0.2 -0.4 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.5 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 0.1 0.9 -0.6 0.5 -0.3
0.4 0.2 0.5
SI 0.7 0.3 -1.0 0.7 -1.0 -1.0 0.6 0.2 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.5 -0.4 -1.0 0.2 -0.1 -1.0 -1.0 -0.4 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.2 -1.0 -1.0 0.3 -1.0 -1.0
0.8 -1.0
SK 0.9 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.7 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.3 -1.0 -1.0 -0.3 -1.0 0.9 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.7 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
-1.0
TR 0.5 -0.8 -1.0 -1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.3 0.4 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -0.5 -1.0 0.6 0.3 -1.0 0.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.5 -1.0 0.7 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.1 -0.5 0.6 0.4
US -0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.6 0.2 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.3 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 0.0
Abbreviations: AT-Austria, AU-Australia, BE-Belgium, CA-Canada, CH-Switzerland, CL-Chile, CZ-Czech Republic, DE-Germany, DK-Denmark, ESEstonia, FI-Finland, FR-France, GB-United Kingdom, GR-Greece, HU-Hungary, IE-Ireland, IS-Island, IT-Italy, JP-Japan, KR-South Korea, LULuxembourg, MX-Mexico, NL-Netherlands, NO-Norway, NZ-New Zealand, PL-Poland, PT-Portugal, SE-Sweden, SI-Slovenia, SK-Slovakia, TR-Turkey,
US-United States of America
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US
-0.7
0.0
-0.2
0.5
0.3
-0.5
-0.9
0.2
-0.6
-0.3
-0.5
0.1
0.3
-0.7
-0.9
0.3
-0.5
0.0
0.2
0.1
-0.6
0.3
0.2
-0.2
-0.2
-0.8
-0.5
-0.4
-0.5
-1.0
-0.8

Appendix 3: Variable Definitions and Sources (Chapter II)

Variable
Contiguous Countries
Geographic Distance
Common Official
Language
Colonial Relations
Same Country
Distance in Legal
Systems
Distance in Religion

Measure
Dummy =1 for contiguous pairs of countries and 0 otherwise
The weighted average distance between the main cities of the home and host
country (unit = 100 km).

Source
1

Dummy=1 if the two countries have the same official language.

1

Dummy=1 if the two countries ever had a colonial ink or a common colonizer
and 0 otherwise.
Dummy=1 if the two countries were part of the same country and 0 otherwise.
Sum of squared differences on 4 legal systems dummies corresponding to Civil,
Common, Customary, and Muslim Law. In case of countries with mixed systems,
equal weights were assigned to all relevant systems.
Difference between the dominant religions in the countries in the pair as well as
the incidence of each country’s dominant religion in the other country

Distance in Property
Absolute value of difference of countries’ standardized POLCON scores
Rights Protection
Distance in Contracting Absolute value of difference of countries’ standardized ‘Index of procedural
Institutions
formalism based on check collection’ score
Absolute value of difference of countries’ standardized scores of the ‘Anti-selfDistance in Shareholder
dealing index’. It describes the strength of minority shareholder protection against
Rights
self-dealing by the controlling shareholder
Absolute value difference in countries’ standardized average of ‘Employment
Distance in Labor
Laws Index’, ‘Collective Relations Laws Index’, and ‘Social Security Laws
Protection
Index’ scores
Dummy=1 if both countries are part of any common Regional Agreement (EU,
CMRA
NAFTA, ASEAN, MERCOSUR, ANDEAN, and CARICOM) and 0 otherwise.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

CEPII database on bilateral distances.
JuriGlobe project of the University of Ottawa
Dow and Karunaratna (2006).
Henisz (2000).
Djankov et al. (2003).
Djankov et al. (2008)
Botero et al. (2004).
Authors’ calculation based on data from World Trade Organisation.
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